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Following the passage of the Affordable Care Act, the government of each U.S. state either 
adopted a state run health insurance exchange or defaulted to a federally run exchange. This 
study uses event history analysis to examine this decision making process and the broader 
diffusion of health insurance exchange policy among the states. The results of this analysis 
indicate that states with a government controlled by the Democratic Party, a moralistic political 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 The United States is currently in the throes of a health care crisis. 48 million 
Americans lack health insurance (U.S. Census Bureau 2012a), the United States spends 
more money on health care than any other nation in the world (Kaiser Family Foundation 
2012c), and despite this additional spending, the U.S. health care system ranks 37th in the 
world, behind middle income countries like Cuba and Saudi Arabia (World Health 
Organization 2000). In March 2010, the US government began to address this crisis by 
passing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The ACA aims to 
increase insurance coverage and lower healthcare costs through an expansion of 
eligibility for public insurance programs, reforms of the private health insurance market, 
and a requirement that individuals purchase insurance coverage or pay a tax penalty 
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2012d, 9). The creation of health insurance exchanges is a 
fundamental element of this legislation. A health insurance exchange is a competitive, yet 
regulated, marketplace where individuals and small businesses can purchase affordable 
health insurance coverage (United States Department of Health and Human Services 
2012; hereafter USDHHS). By simplifying and clarifying the health insurance purchasing 
process for consumers and by grouping small businesses and individuals into larger risk 
pools, health insurance exchanges are expected to both increase insurance coverage and 
lower insurance premiums. Under the ACA, a health insurance exchange must be 
operating in every state by 2014 (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012a, 1). 
In responding to this requirement of the ACA, states were faced with an important 
policy decision. States were given the option of either creating a fully state-based 
exchange, partnering with the federal government to develop and operate an exchange, or 
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allowing the federal government to completely design and operate an exchange on the 
state’s behalf. States were required to inform the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services of their decision on this issue by December 14, 2012 (Kaiser Family Foundation 
2012a, 1). During the two and a half years between the initial passage of the ACA and the 
federal decision deadline, state health insurance exchange policy spread among the states 
as twenty four states and the District of Columbia either established or declared their 
intent to establish a state-based or federal-state partnership exchange (Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2013b).   
 Examining all of the states’ decisions on this issue and the larger spread of health 
insurance exchange policy raises a number of questions: Why did certain states establish 
a health insurance exchange while other states did not? What diverse array of factors 
played a role in each state’s unique decision to either establish or not establish an 
exchange? Why did certain states establish an exchange earlier than other states? Given 
the sharply partisan discourse surrounding the passage of the ACA, it may be tempting to 
assume that Democratic state governments uniformly adopted health insurance exchange 
policy, while Republican state governments did not. However, the decision of a few 
traditionally Republican states such as Idaho, Utah, and Iowa to establish state run or 
federal state partnership exchanges (Kaiser Family Foundation 2013b) indicates that 
factors beyond the party control of the state government play a role in the spread of this 
policy. By examining the spread of health insurance exchange policy among the states, 
this study provides some answers to the above questions and some key insights into the 
process of health insurance exchange policy adoption.  
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 The recent spread of health insurance exchange policy is an example of the 
process of policy diffusion in action. Policy diffusion is defined as the spread of policy 
innovations among governments over time (Rogers 1983, 5; Shipan and Volden 2012, 
788). A significant literature examines the process of policy diffusion among national, 
municipal, and state governments globally. The main theory underlying the policy 
diffusion literature is Lawrence Mohr’s theory of the determinants of innovations (1969). 
Mohr theorizes that innovation among organizations is “directly related to the motivation 
to innovate, inversely related to the strength of obstacles to innovation, and directly 
related to the availability of resources for overcoming such obstacles” (1969, 114). Using 
the existing policy diffusion literature and Mohr’s theory as a guide, I statistically 
examine the impact of a variety of independent variables on health insurance exchange 
policy adoption. All of the selected factors either directly measure or directly impact the 
motivation to innovate, the obstacles to innovation, or the resources available for 
overcoming these obstacles.  
Using Mohr’s theory as a framework, I argue that the motivation to innovate is 
the key factor in the diffusion of health insurance exchange policy. While the obstacles to 
innovation and the resources available for overcoming those obstacles may also have an 
impact, the variables which measured the motivation to innovate consistently had a 
statistically significant impact on health insurance exchange policy diffusion. Of the 
variables measuring the motivation to innovate, the party control of the state’s 
government, the state’s political culture, and the size of the state’s uninsured population 
are particularly important determinants of health insurance exchange policy adoption. On 
the whole, states with governments controlled by the Democratic Party, states with a 
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moralistic political culture, and states with a higher uninsured population have a greater 
motivation to adopt health insurance exchange policy than states without these 
characteristics. Statistical analyses confirm that states with these characteristics are 
indeed more likely to adopt health insurance exchange policy.  
 The findings of this thesis are useful to both health policy leaders and policy 
diffusion scholars. Admittedly, the broader implications of this study are somewhat 
limited, since the diffusion of each policy is a unique process. However, similar public 
policies tend to diffuse in similar ways. Accordingly, this study provides significant 
insights into the diffusion of health reform policy generally. Healthcare reform is a 
complicated public policy issue and despite the passage of the ACA, state and national 
governments will continue to adopt health reform policies, including further reforms of 
the states’ health insurance exchanges. Indeed, states are currently in the process of 
deciding whether to expand the eligibility of their Medicaid program under the ACA 
(Somashekhar 2013). Although the specifics of the diffusion of each health policy will be 
different, similar factors are likely to play a role in health insurance exchange policy 
diffusion and the diffusion of other health reforms. Since the motivation to innovate is the 
primary determinant of health insurance exchange policy adoption, it is likely to also be 
the primary factor in determining the adoption of other health reform policies. Armed 
with this information, policy leaders can successfully advocate for health reform policies 
in the future. More specifically, policy leaders can directly use the findings of this study 
to efficiently focus their advocacy on increasing the state government’s motivation to 
innovate. For example, since states with a higher uninsured population were more likely 
to adopt health insurance exchange policy, policy advocates can subsequently emphasize 
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their state’s uninsured population, the challenges this population faces, and the ways in 
which the given policy addresses these challenges in order to effectively increase the 
government’s motivation to adopt the policy innovation. Overall, the findings of this 
research can be used by policy leaders to increase their capacity to create change through 
public policy adoption. 
 In addition to providing public policy leaders with knowledge applicable to their 
work, this thesis also contributes to the corresponding academic literature. Although the 
policy diffusion literature is currently a prolific area of academic study, the field 
developed fairly recently. Due to the recent development of this literature, only a few 
studies examine each public policy area. Accordingly, a limited literature examines the 
diffusion of health reform policies (Balla 2001; Karch 2006; Karch 2007a; Stream 1999; 
Volden 2006). Additionally, since the health insurance exchange diffusion process ended 
less than six months ago, this study is a foray into an unexamined topic in the broader 
literature. Since similar policies often diffuse in similar ways, the findings of this study 
can assist scholars in the development of future health policy diffusion studies. Indeed, 
much of the methodological design of this research and in particular, the selection of 
variables to include in the statistical analyses, was informed by the findings of the 
existing health policy diffusion literature. By alerting scholars to the relative importance 
of the motivation to innovate in health policy diffusion processes, this study encourages 
scholars to focus their future research on the motivation of state governments to adopt the 
health policy being studied. 
 I begin this thesis with a brief background on health insurance exchanges and 
their history in the United States. In this section, I outline the specific features and 
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functions of a health insurance exchange with the specific aim of explaining how health 
insurance exchanges are expected to increase health insurance coverage and lower the 
cost of health insurance premiums. For the most part, these objectives are achieved by 
addressing some of the inherent challenges of the health insurance market. Accordingly, 
this discussion is framed as an explanation of a few health insurance market challenges 
and how health insurance exchanges address these challenges. I then chart the historical 
emergence of health insurance exchanges as an element of comprehensive health reform 
in the United States. Although they were referred to as health insurance alliances at the 
time, health insurance exchanges first appeared in a national comprehensive health 
reform plan in President Clinton’s 1994 health reform proposal (Starr 1994, 85). 
Although Clinton’s reform effort failed, a health insurance exchange was successfully 
implemented at the state wide level in Massachusetts in 2006 (Kaiser Family Foundation 
2012d). Using Massachusetts’ reform efforts as an example, the federal government 
passed the ACA, which, among other reforms, requires each state to have an operational 
health insurance exchange (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012d, 7). After outlining this 
history, I explain the requirements the ACA places on states in regards to health 
insurance exchange establishment. Altogether, Chapter 2 explains the historical context 
underlying health insurance exchange policy diffusion. 
 After explaining the practical context of this study, I discuss the academic and 
theoretical context of the study. More specifically, Chapter 3 reviews the policy diffusion 
literature. The chapter begins with a discussion of the theory underlying the policy 
diffusion literature and the subsequent development of the literature. As discussed earlier 
in the introduction, Lawrence Mohr’s theory of the diffusion of innovations underlies the 
7 
 
policy diffusion literature. To review, Mohr theorizes that innovation is negatively 
associated with the obstacles to innovation and is positively associated with the 
motivation to innovate and the resources available for overcoming the obstacles to 
innovation (1969, 114). Mohr’s theoretical concepts were applied to the ideas of the 
policy determinants literature, which examines the relationship between policy outcomes, 
state characteristics, and the political process, to form the contemporary policy diffusion 
literature. By explaining how internal state characteristics, aspects of the political 
process, and the actions of actors external to a state government can impact policy 
diffusion using Mohr’s theory, Berry and Berry developed the policy diffusion literature. 
They were also the first scholars to apply the statistical methods of event history analysis 
to the study of policy diffusion (Berry and Berry 1990). Since the contemporary policy 
diffusion literature is relatively complex and lacks organization1, I present this literature 
by listing several independent factors that are expected to have an impact on policy 
diffusion and that are usually included in policy diffusion studies. Mohr’s theory explains 
each variable’s expected impact on policy diffusion. The factors outlined in this section 
are also included as variables in this study’s statistical analyses. Due to the strong 
involvement of the federal government in the process of health insurance exchange policy 
diffusion, I also outline some of the ways in which the federal government can impact 
policy diffusion. Since similar policies’ diffusion processes are often impacted by similar 
factors, Chapter 3 concludes with a discussion of some of the factors that specifically 
play a role in the diffusion of health policies.  
                                                          
1
 Shipan and Volden describe the complexity of the literature, “Indeed, it is hard to see the forest through 
all the trees” (2012). ` 
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In Chapter 4, I explain the statistical methods I use to determine the impact of the 
variables discussed in Chapter 3 on health insurance exchange policy diffusion. More 
specifically, I use the standard statistical method for policy diffusion studies, event 
history analysis. Event history analysis is a branch of statistics that examines and explains 
patterns of events (Yamaguchi 1991, 1). In this case, this technique is used to explain 
state health insurance exchange policy adoptions. After describing how I specifically use 
event history analysis in this research, I outline the dependent variable and many 
independent variables used in this study. I also explain how each variable was measured 
and cite the sources from which I gathered data.   
Chapter 5 outlines the findings of the analyses described in Chapter 4. The 
findings of these analyses indicate that the partisan makeup of the state’s government, the 
state’s political culture, and the size of the state’s uninsured population have a 
statistically significant impact on the likelihood that a state will establish a state run or 
partnership exchange. Since all of these variables measure a state’s motivation to adopt 
the policy, these results also demonstrate that the motivation to innovate is the most 
explanatory element of Mohr’s theory in the case of health insurance exchange policy 
diffusion. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the broader policy implications of 
these findings.  
Finally, I conclude the thesis with a summary of the study and its findings and a 
discussion of avenues for further health policy diffusion research. Altogether, this 
research provides notable insights into the recent process of health insurance exchange 





Chapter 2: Historical Background Information 
 
Introduction 
 Over the past two years, each state has decided whether or not to adopt health 
insurance exchange legislation. While the impetus for this decision making process was 
the passage of the Affordable Care Act, health insurance exchanges emerged as an 
element of health reform proposals before 2010. A general understanding of health 
insurance exchanges and their history is fundamental to understanding their vital role in 
the national model for reform and subsequent spread throughout the United States. I 
begin this chapter by explaining how a health insurance exchange addresses some of the 
unique challenges of the health insurance market. For example, health insurance 
exchanges are expected to help lower the extremely high premium costs paid by small 
businesses and individuals. I then briefly chart the emergence of the health insurance 
exchange as a reform proposal on the national stage and its adoption at the state level in 
Massachusetts in order to provide some historical context to its inclusion in the ACA.  
Finally, I discuss the ACA and the requirements it places on states in regards to health 
insurance exchanges. Overall, this chapter provides an understanding of the historical and 
policy context of state governments’ health insurance exchange policy adoptions. The 
background information presented in this chapter is essential to understanding why state 
governments are seriously considering health insurance exchange policy adoption and to 
understand why and how the federal government has promoted state health insurance 




Health Insurance Exchanges: Addressing the Unique Challenges of the Private Health 
Insurance Market 
 The private health insurance market is rife with challenges that reformers must 
overcome in order to achieve comprehensive health reform. In this section, I outline a 
few of these challenges and discuss how a health insurance exchange addresses these 
issues. I also describe the typical features and functions of a health insurance exchange.  
 The unique dynamics between consumers and providers of health insurance have 
created several challenging features and practices within the private health insurance 
market. The main root of most of these challenges is a lack of information, whether on 
the part of the consumer or the provider. First of all, the consumer usually does not have 
enough information about insurers and the plans they offer to make an appropriate, cost 
effective purchasing decision. Although a lack of appropriate consumer knowledge is 
often an issue in the purchase of products, in the context of health care decisions, the gap 
in information between providers and consumers is particularly large. Health care 
decisions are often complex and technical and consumers tend to trust the advice of 
experts such as insurance providers (Henderson 2005, 163). Additionally, for the many 
Americans who receive health insurance through their employer, there is often no choice 
in selecting an insurance plan as the employer only offers one option. About 47 percent 
of individuals who receive health benefits through their employer do not have a choice of 
insurance plans (Villegas 2009). The result is a system in which consumers rarely have 
the information or ability to make an educated health insurance purchasing decision. 
 Within the health insurance market, insurance companies also lack a significant 
amount of important information, namely the future medical needs of an individual. 
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Understandably, some uncertainty will always exist regarding this issue, as the need for 
medical care is unpredictable. However, insurance companies also need to predict future 
medical needs as much as possible in order to ensure they collect enough money from the 
insurance pool to pay for the health care needed by the pool and the administrative costs 
of the company (Henderson 2005, 160).  Achieving the appropriate financial balance 
between insurance premiums and health care payments is easier with a larger rather than 
a smaller insurance pool. The larger the number of individuals in the pool, the larger the 
number of healthy individuals who can offset the increased medical care costs of a sick or 
injured individual (Henderson 2005, 160). The realities of risk pooling make it 
challenging for small businesses and individuals to purchase health insurance. While a 
large business with many employees will have a large enough pool to appropriately 
spread the risk, a small business with only a few employees will not. If a few employees 
are older than average, have significant preexisting medical conditions, or become very 
sick, the premium costs for the pool will increase dramatically to offset this risk. As a 
result, many small businesses do not offer medical benefits (The Washington Post 2009). 
This problem is exacerbated for individuals entering the market on their own. Since these 
individuals are not pooled at all, their premiums, deductibles, and copays are very high 
(Pickert 2009). According to a Commonwealth Fund report, 57% of individuals seeking 
private insurance found it difficult or impossible to find affordable coverage and 36% of 
individuals seeking coverage were either denied coverage or charged more due to a 
preexisting medical condition (Doty et al. 2009, 2-3).  
 Health insurance exchanges effectively address both the lack of consumer 
information and the increased premium costs paid by small businesses and individuals. 
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According to the White House, a health insurance exchange is a state-based competitive 
marketplace where individuals and small businesses can purchase affordable private 
health insurance (USDHHS 2012). The exchange serves three major functions. Firstly, 
the exchange groups individuals and small business employees into larger insurance 
pools. Since the larger pools formed through the exchange spread the risk of insuring 
small business employees and individuals over a larger group, exchanges are expected to 
lower premiums for small businesses and individuals (Pickert 2009). Secondly, the 
exchange can serve a regulatory function by determining which insurance companies are 
allowed to sell which insurance plans on the exchange (USDHHS 2012).2 At the very 
least, all plans being sold on the exchange must offer a minimum package of essential 
health benefits (Pickert 2009).3  
Finally, most of the specific functions and features of the exchange are aimed at 
addressing the lack of consumer information in the purchasing process by improving the 
ability of consumers to make educated purchasing decisions. To fulfill this objective, 
exchanges rate insurance plans based on quality and price, provide information about 
insurance plans in a standard format, provide consumers with a calculator that determines 
the cost of insurance after accounting for federal benefits, determine eligibility for federal 
tax benefits or other public coverage programs such as Medicaid, operate both a website 
and telephone hotline where consumers can receive information and purchase coverage, 
                                                          
2
 States may choose to run their exchange under a clearinghouse model, in which the exchange must 
contract will all insurance companies meeting the minimum requirements. However, the state may also 
adopt an active purchaser model in which the exchange selectively contracts with insurers. This model 
allows the exchange to further improve quality and cost by refusing to contract with companies who do not 
meet additional standards. States are actively pursuing both models, although active purchasing is more 
common overall (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012a). 
3
 The ACA defines essential health benefits as coverage in the following areas: ambulatory patient services, 
emergency services, hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental health and substance abuse 
services, prescription drugs, rehabilitation services and devices, laboratory services, preventative care, 
chronic disease management, and pediatric care, including dental and vision (USDHHS 2013).  
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and hire navigators, who will help consumers make purchasing decisions and access their 
insurance coverage in person (USDHHS 2012). These functions of the exchange and in 
particular the website have been likened to version of Travelocity or Expedia for health 
insurance. Although not an exact analogy, the exchange websites will allow consumers to 
directly compare the costs and benefits of different health plans from different companies 
(The District of Colombia). Altogether, health insurance exchange should make 
purchasing health insurance a transparent and easy process for consumers (Pickert 2009).  
 
Adopting Health Insurance Exchanges: From Massachusetts to Washington to the States 
 Although health insurance exchanges were only recently adopted nationwide as 
an element of comprehensive health reform legislation, Massachusetts implemented an 
exchange at the statewide level prior to the adoption of the ACA. The health care reforms 
instituted in Massachusetts, including the exchange, were a policy example emulated by 
the federal government. Many of the basic elements of Massachusetts’ reform legislation 
diffused from the state to the national level and were ultimately included in the ACA, 
including state run health insurance exchanges. The ACA requires states to decide 
whether they will establish a health insurance exchange themselves or default to a 
federally run exchange. 
Although first implemented in Massachusetts, health insurance exchanges 
emerged on the national level as an element of President Clinton’s failed 1993 healthcare 
reform plan. One provision of his plan was the creation of health insurance “alliances”. 
Health insurance alliances would have covered employees of businesses with fewer than 
5,000 employees and individuals not receiving insurance through their employer. 
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Alternatively, businesses with more than 5,000 employees would have chosen to either 
establish their own corporate alliance or participate in the existing alliance (Starr 1994, 
85). Although Clinton’s efforts were unsuccessful, the extensive discussion of his plan 
increased the profile of health insurance alliances, later referred to as health insurance 
exchanges, in the national health policy conversation. 
 After Clinton’s efforts failed, major attempts to achieve universal health coverage 
occurred primarily at the state level with Massachusetts being the first state to actually 
enact comprehensive health reform legislation. Massachusetts has a long history as a 
leader in health reform (Gray 1994, 217) and this history continued on April 12, 2006 
when Governor Mitt Romney signed Massachusetts’ bipartisan health reform bill into 
law (McDonough 2011, 37). This legislation reformed the existing insurance system, 
expanded eligibility for state coverage programs, required everyone to purchase health 
insurance, and created a health insurance exchange (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012d; 
Raymond 2011; Massachusetts Health Connector 2012).  
Through Massachusetts’ exchange, called the Health Connector, individuals 
receive either subsidized insurance, which allows low income individuals to pay an 
income adjusted sliding scale premium, (Raymond 2011, 6) or non-subsidized insurance 
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2012d, 2). The exchange selects participating insurers based 
on the quality and cost of their coverage and the size of their provider network, and 
presents insurance plan options to consumers in a clear manner (Raymond 2011, 17-8). 
Small businesses can provide their employees with insurance coverage through the 
exchange’s Business Express program (Raymond 2011, 18).  In the five years since 
Massachusetts implemented health reform legislation (McDonough2011, 42), insurance 
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coverage and access to care have improved, while costs have been unaffected.  In terms 
of expanding insurance coverage, the Massachusetts reform plan has been successful. 
Since the passage of reform, an estimated 411,000 Massachusetts residents have gained 
insurance coverage (Raymond 2011, 26) and the number of uninsured residents has  
dropped to 1.9% of the population, the lowest in the nation (Raymond 2011, 26; 
Massachusetts Health Connector 2012). Additionally, access to medical care has 
improved throughout the entire population. The number of unnecessary emergency care 
visits and hospital stays has decreased, as has the number of adults struggling to pay for 
care (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012d, 5). The number of people using primary care 
doctors and engaging in preventative care has increased. Racial and ethnic disparities in 
access to care have also decreased (Raymond 2011, 26). However, despite these 
improvements in coverage and access, the cost of care continues to be a problem in 
Massachusetts. Although state legislators made a conscious effort to focus first and 
foremost on addressing coverage issues with their reform effort (Raymond 2011, 28), the 
state has the highest individual market premiums in the nation and spends significantly 
more than the national average on health care (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012d, 7). In 
response, the state has continued to further reform the system in an effort to contain costs 
(Raymond 2011, 28).  
 Using the Massachusetts reform effort as a model, the federal government enacted 
comprehensive health reform legislation in March 2010 with the passage of the ACA. 
There are a few differences between the two pieces of legislation. However, most of these 
differences are due to the larger scope of the federal legislation. For example, the ACA 
also reforms existing federal health programs such as Medicare. Despite these 
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differences, the mechanisms for expanding insurance coverage included in the ACA are 
very similar to the reforms enacted in Massachusetts (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012d, 
7). In addition to a number of reforms aimed at cost containment and quality 
improvement4, the ACA expands insurance coverage by increasing Medicaid eligibility, 
instituting private health insurance market reforms, enacting an individual mandate, 
which requires individuals to purchase insurance or pay a tax penalty, providing tax 
credits to help eligible individuals afford insurance premiums, and creating health 
insurance exchanges in each state where individuals and small businesses can purchase 
health insurance (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012d, 9).   
 The portion of the ACA which establishes health insurance exchanges in each of 
the US states and the District of Columbia requires states to make a crucial policy 
decision. By January 1, 2014, a health insurance exchange must be operating in every 
state. While the intent of the law is for states to establish these exchanges themselves, the 
Federal Department of Health and Human Services will establish and run an exchange for 
the state if the state is unable or is unwilling to do so (McDonough 2011, 114). In 
responding to this requirement of the ACA, states have three policy options. States may 
establish their own state-based exchange, enter into a partnership exchange between the 
state and the federal government, or default through a lack of action to a federally run 
exchange (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012a, 1). In an entirely state-based exchange, each 
state’s government is responsible for operating all of the features and functions of the 
exchange. A state-based exchange has the advantage of offering the state a degree of 
autonomy from the federal government in developing and operating their exchange. 
                                                          
4
 Some of these additional reforms include reforms to Medicare, creating preventative care programs, 
increasing the healthcare workforce, providing financial support to disabled individuals to allow them to 
live at home, and encouraging pharmaceutical innovation (McDonough 2011, 104). 
17 
 
When state governments develop an exchange themselves, they are able to craft an 
exchange that suits their state’s private insurance market and effectively serves their 
state’s population. Beginning in 2017, states may even receive a waiver from certain 
exchange requirements of the ACA if the state’s proposed insurance coverage plan is at 
least as comprehensive as the ACA’s exchange system (Kaiser Family Foundation 2011, 
7).5  In a partnership exchange the state operates some of the exchange functions, while 
the federal government runs the rest of the exchange. The specifics of this division of 
labor are determined individually for each state establishing a partnership exchange. 
When a state adopts a partnership exchange, the state is able to both develop an exchange 
uniquely suited to its needs and receive additional support and resources from the federal 
government. The partnership exchanges are a particularly viable option for states with 
small populations as these states could benefit from the additional resources of the federal 
government. However, this is not always the case, since Illinois is establishing a 
partnership exchange (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012a, 2). States that default to a 
federal exchange have little to no control over the design and functionality of their 
exchange. However, state governments in states with federal exchanges do not need to 
expend personnel or financial resources on the development and operation of the 
exchange. States were required to submit an application to the Department of Health and 
Human Services outlining their plan to establish an exchange by December 14, 2012 in 
order to pursue a state-run exchange (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012a, 1).  
 
                                                          
5
 At this point, Vermont plans on taking advantage of this opportunity. The state’s exchange legislation 
established a plan for Vermont to transition from a typical exchange system to a single payer system that 
will provide coverage to all of the state’s residents in 2017 with an expected federal waiver (Kaiser Family 




 Building off of Massachusetts’ example, the US government recently passed 
comprehensive health reform legislation. One of the major components of this legislation 
is the creation of a health insurance exchange in each state. These exchanges are expected 
to expand insurance coverage and control costs by addressing the knowledge disparities 
that exist between consumers and insurance companies. The exchanges work to lower 
insurance premiums and address insurance companies’ lack of knowledge concerning 
their consumers’ future healthcare needs by providing a marketplace where small 
businesses and individuals can pool their risk. Exchanges also disseminate information 
about insurance plan options transparently, providing consumers with the knowledge they 
need to make educated health insurance purchasing decisions. In order to fulfill the 
requirements of the ACA, states must determine whether they will establish a health 
insurance exchange themselves, partner with the federal government, or allow the federal 
government to establish an exchange on their behalf. This chapter presents the 
background information on health insurance exchanges and their history needed to 
understand this state decision making process and its important role in the broader 














Chapter 3: The Policy Diffusion Literature 
 
Introduction 
 This study aims to explain the recent and rapid spread of health insurance 
exchange creation legislation among the states. In particular, this research examines the 
decision of states to adopt or not adopt the legislation, the timing of the states’ decisions, 
and the broader temporal and geographic spread of health insurance exchange policy. The 
decision to adopt such a policy is “determined by the interplay of an infinitely large 
number of elements” (Gray 1973, 1175). Even though the process of policy adoption is 
complex, the policy diffusion literature provides some key insights into the factors that 
are most likely to have a significant impact on the spread of health insurance exchange 
policy. Policy diffusion is defined as the spread of policy innovations among 
governments over time (Rogers 1983, 5; Shipan and Volden 2012, 788). The recent 
spread of health insurance exchange policy among the states is an example of policy 
diffusion in action. The policy diffusion literature provides the underlying theoretical 
framework for this study, informs the methodological design of this study, and informs 
my hypotheses. 
 The theoretical basis of the policy diffusion literature and of this study is 
Lawrence Mohr’s diffusion of innovations theory. Mohr theorizes that the key 
determinants of organizational innovation are the motivation to innovate, the obstacles to 
innovation, and the resources available for overcoming these obstacles. While obstacles 
to innovation are negatively associated with organization innovation, the resources for 
overcoming these obstacles and the motivation to innovation are positively associated 
with innovation (1969, 114). Mohr’s theory is a useful framework for understanding and 
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explaining the adoption and diffusion of health insurance exchange policy by state 
governments and the impact of wide array of factors on exchange policy adoption and 
diffusion. The decision of each state’s government to either adopt or not adopt health 
insurance exchange policy can be understood in relation to their motivation to innovate, 
the obstacles to their innovation, and their available resources for overcoming the 
obstacles to innovation. Furthermore, the impact of specific factors on the exchange 
policy diffusion process can be understood and explained in terms of how the factors 
either measure or directly impact states’ motivation to adopt a health insurance exchange, 
the obstacles to adoption, or the resources available for overcoming these obstacles.  
I begin Chapter 3 with a more thorough discussion of Mohr’s theory and its 
applicability to policy diffusion studies.  I then provide an overview of the historical 
development of the policy diffusion literature with a particular emphasis on the 
groundbreaking work of Berry and Berry (1990). The policy diffusion literature emerges 
from two disparate literatures, the diffusion of innovations literature and the policy 
determinants literature.  Berry and Berry bring these two fields together by framing their 
respective ideas using a single theoretical framework, namely Mohr’s theory. Berry and 
Berry were also the first scholars to develop a statistical methodology for testing the 
applicability of Mohr’s theory to policy diffusion.  Next, I broadly summarize the 
contemporary policy diffusion literature by outlining the factors that usually appear in 
policy diffusion analyses. Commonly studied factors include the state’s socioeconomic 
and political characteristics, its degree of geographic proximity to earlier adopters, and 
the policy’s specific context. The potential impact of each of these factors is explained 
using Mohr’s theory. Since the Federal Government actively promoted state health 
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insurance exchange policy adoption, I also discuss the segment of the policy diffusion 
literature which examines the impact of national government action on state policy 
diffusion.  Although most policy diffusion studies consider the impact of fairly similar 
variables, the diffusion process varies greatly depending on the specific policy being 
considered. Thus, studies which examine the diffusion of similar health reform policies 
particularly inform my research. Accordingly, I conclude this chapter with a discussion of 
other health policy diffusion studies. 
 
Theoretical Basis for Literature 
 The policy diffusion literature is theoretically rooted in the diffusion of 
innovations literature. The diffusion of innovations literature broadly examines the 
processes by which innovations, defined as an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as 
new by the unit of adoption, are communicated through certain channels over time among 
the members of a social system (Rogers 1983). While research examining the diffusion of 
innovations initially emerged in the areas of sociology and anthropology (Rogers 1983, 
42), diffusion studies have since expanded to a wide variety of academic fields, including 
political science. Studies examining the diffusion of innovations focus on determining 
which innovations are most likely to be diffused, which units of adoption are most likely 
to effectively communicate and share innovations with one another, which units of 
adoption are likely to adopt innovations earlier, and the role of other actors in the 
diffusion process (Rogers 1983). 
  Building upon the diffusion of innovations literature, Lawrence Mohr develops a 
specific theory of the determinants of innovation in organizations. Mohr’s work focuses 
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on explaining why certain organizations innovate, meaning they adopt and emphasize 
policies or programs that depart from tradition, while others do not (1969, 111). As I 
explained in the introduction to this chapter, he theorizes that innovation “is directly 
related to the motivation to innovate, inversely related to the strength of obstacles to 
innovation, and directly related to the availability of resources for overcoming such 
obstacles” (Mohr 1969, 114). Since the motivation to innovate, the obstacles to 
innovation, and the resources available for overcoming obstacles to innovation are the 
key determinants of innovation, the relative innovativeness of organizations, including 
state governments, is a function of their relative motivation levels, obstacles, and 
resources. Mohr’s theory in turn explains why certain independent variables, such as 
community norms, environmental demands, organizational goals, and wealth may have 
an impact on innovation. If these variables measure in some capacity the motivation to 
innovate, obstacles to innovation, or resources to overcome those obstacles, they are 
likely to have a discernible impact on innovation in the direction indicated by the theory 
(Mohr 1969, 114). For example, the financial wealth of an organization is a measure of 
its resources, and thus, wealthier organizations ought to be more innovative than poorer 
organizations (Mohr 1969, 119). Although Mohr tests his theory by examining the 
innovativeness of public health departments, I extend his analysis by applying his theory 
to health insurance exchange policy adoption on the part of state governments.  
Mohr’s understanding of the determinants of innovation has informed many 
studies of state policy diffusion and in particular, the selection of factors to be included in 
statistical analyses of diffusion. Mohr’s diffusion of innovations theory also informs this 
study and its research design. Since each state’s decision to either adopt or not adopt a 
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health insurance exchange is determined by its motivation to adopt the policy, the 
obstacles to adoption, and the resources for overcoming the obstacles to adoption, I 
include factors that either impact or directly measure a state’s motivation, obstacles or 
resources in my analysis of health insurance exchange policy diffusion. Mohr’s work also 
provides a theoretical basis for forming hypotheses about how these chosen factors will 
impact the diffusion process. Specifically, factors that measure motivation or resources 
should have a positive impact on health insurance exchange adoption, while factors 
measuring the obstacles to innovation should have a negative impact (Mohr 1969, 114).  
 
Historical Development of the Literature 
 The contemporary policy diffusion literature emerges from two disparate 
literatures, the diffusion of innovations literature, discussed above, and the policy 
determinants literature. The policy determinants literature aims to explain policy 
outcomes in the states by examining the relationship between these outcomes, the 
political process, and socioeconomic variables (Dye 1966, 1; Fenton and Chamberlayne 
1969, 388).  Some major distinctions between these two literatures are the time period 
and number of decision-makers considered. While the diffusion of innovations literature 
examines the spread of innovations among several decision-makers over time, the policy 
determinants literature examines the adoption of a single policy at a single point by a 
single state.  
The policy determinants literature is based on a fairly simple model of public 
policy decision-making. In this model, policy outcomes are seen as the result of outside 
forces, namely the socioeconomic conditions external to the political system, brought to 
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bear upon a political system. The outside forces then cause the system to make particular 
responses in the form of policy adoptions (Dye 1966, 3). The policy determinants 
literature’s model of policy decision-making conceives of policy adoption as a process of 
external variables both directly and indirectly, by means of mediation through the 
political system and the political process, impacting public policy (Dye 1966, 3; Dawson 
and Robinson 1963, 266).  
To test the applicability of this model, scholars analyze the correlations between 
specific state policy outcomes, state socioeconomic characteristics, and characteristics of 
the state’s political system. Scholars usually include urbanization, industrialization, 
wealth, and level of education in their analyses as socioeconomic characteristics (Dawson 
and Robinson 1963, 280; Dye 1966, 7). These four characteristics are viewed as good 
measures of the economic development of a state, which in turn shapes the state’s 
political system and policy decisions (Dye 1966, 7). Scholars typically include the degree 
of interparty competition, the partisan makeup of the legislature, voter turnout, and the 
degree of malapportionment in legislative districts as political system characteristics in 
their analyses (Dye 1966, 13). The policy determinants literature indicates that 
socioeconomic characteristics have a larger impact on policy adoption than political 
system characteristics (Dawson and Robinson 1963; Dye 1966; Fenton and 
Chamberlayne 1969). This finding both confirms the policy determinants literature’s 
model of public policy decision-making and demonstrates the importance of state 
socioeconomic characteristics as determinants of policy adoption.  
 Jack Walker makes a significant contribution to the development of the policy 
diffusion literature by utilizing both the ideas of the policy determinants literature and the 
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diffusion of innovations literature in a single study. By examining how internal state 
characteristics impact a state’s general level of innovativeness and how innovations 
spread among the states, Walker begins to bring together these two disparate fields of 
study. 
Walker sets out to determine the relative innovativeness of each state. He creates 
innovation scores for each of the states based on their adoption, or lack thereof, of eighty 
eight different policies across a broad range of policy areas (1969, 882). To determine 
why certain states have higher innovation scores, he examines the correlations between a 
high innovation score and various state socioeconomic and political system 
characteristics, as in the policy determinants literature (Walker 1969).  
However, Walker also examines the geographic and temporal spread of these 
policies among the states and theorizes that policies diffuse in regional clusters. 
Throughout history, states have adopted very similar public policies, indicating that a 
significant degree of policy communication is occurring between states.  A particularly 
illustrative example of this phenomenon is the spread of California’s fair trade law, in 
which ten states directly copied major typographical errors found in the original 
legislation’s language (Walker 1969, 881). Walker theorizes that states choose to adopt 
another state’s policies in order to emulate successful policies or bolster their economic 
competitiveness with the earlier adopter (1969, 890). For this competition or emulation to 
occur, there must be strong communication channels between the states’ governments. 
Indeed, the process of diffusion is defined as the communication of innovations among 
decision makers (Rogers 1983, 5). Given the tendency for organizations to most 
effectively communicate with and learn from similar organizations (Rogers 1983, 274), 
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Walker theorizes that policies diffuse in regional clusters. He expects the process of 
policy diffusion to begin with the adoption of a policy by a particularly innovative policy 
leader in a region, with the policy being subsequently communicated to and adopted by 
similar, neighboring states (1969, 893). Even though statistical analysis only moderately 
supported Walker’s model (1969, 893) and even though his study was criticized by 
scholars (Gray 1973),6 his work was an important starting point for the further 
development of the policy diffusion literature.  
 Although Walker examines the impact of both internal determinants and external 
determinants on policy diffusion in the same article, his analyses of the internal 
determinants and the external determinants of diffusion are independent of one another in 
both theory and practice (Berry and Berry 1990, 396). Berry and Berry address this issue 
by merging the study of internal and external factors theoretically and methodologically. 
By explaining the impact of internal and external state characteristics on policy diffusion 
using the same theory, namely Mohr’s theory of the determinants of innovation, Berry 
and Berry firmly bring together the policy determinants and diffusion of innovations 
literatures. Berry and Berry also apply a statistical technique, event history analysis, to 
the study of policy diffusion. Using this technique, scholars can examine the role of 
internal and external factors in policy outcomes in a single analysis. 
Before Berry and Berry’s study many scholars viewed the internal determinants 
of policy adoption and regional policy diffusion as independent areas of study. In contrast 
                                                          
6
 Gray’s criticisms were mainly focused on Walker’s treatment of innovation as a single composite 
variable. Gray pointed out the significant degree of diversity in the diffusion of policies and even 
demonstrated that different types of policies diffused in different ways in Walker’s own data set. Since 
different policies diffuse in different ways and since states are not uniformly innovative across all policy 
areas, she argued that Walker’s composite innovation score and his subsequent analyses using this measure 
oversimplified the process of policy diffusion. In accordance with these concerns, most contemporary 
policy diffusion scholars study the diffusion of specific policies. 
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to this view, Berry and Berry think of regional diffusion as a potential determinant, just 
as internal state characteristics are determinants, of policy innovation (1990, 396). As 
evidence for their perspective, Berry and Berry cite the practical process of state policy 
adoption. As they point out, “It is unrealistic to assume that a state blindly emulates its 
neighbors’ policies without its public officials being influenced by the political and 
economic environment of their own state. It is also implausible to presume that states are 
totally insulated from influence by neighboring states” (1990, 396). Thus, the impact of 
internal factors and the impact of a policy’s previous diffusion ought to be analyzed 
together, as they operate in conjunction with each other in practice.  
Berry and Berry also demonstrate that the impact of both diffusion and state 
characteristics can be understood and explained using the same theoretical foundation, 
Mohr’s theory of the determinants of innovation. As a review, Mohr argues “that the 
probability of innovation is inversely related to the strength of obstacles to innovation 
and directly related to the motivation to innovate and the availability of resources for 
overcoming obstacles” (Berry and Berry 1990, 399). It is clear that a variety of internal 
determinants of innovation, such as the political and economic conditions of a state, 
impact either the motivation to innovate on the part of politicians, the strength of 
obstacles to innovation, or the resources available for overcoming those obstacles (Berry 
and Berry 1990, 400). However, Berry and Berry argue that previous policy adoptions by 
nearby states also fit into Mohr’s theory. Specifically, previous adoption by other states 
provides a state with more information on the effects of the policy under consideration, 
which is difficult to determine in advance. The information gleaned from other states’ 
actions is a resource for overcoming the obstacle of uncertainty (1990, 400). Since both 
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internal state characteristics and regional diffusion can be thought of as determinants of 
innovation using Mohr’s theory, Berry and Berry argue a unified theory of state policy 
innovation, which relies on both internal and external factors, should be developed.   
Another weakness of early policy diffusion studies is their inability to examine 
the internal determinants of policy adoption and the regional diffusion of policies using a 
single statistical methodology. For example, Walker uses different statistical methods for 
his analyses of policy innovation and policy diffusion in his research7 (Walker 1969). 
Berry and Berry address the policy diffusion literature’s statistical weakness by 
developing a statistical method for concurrently examining the impact of internal and 
external factors on policy diffusion. This statistical methodology is event history analysis. 
Originally developed in the field of biostatistics as a means of analyzing mortality and 
health outcomes (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 7), event history analysis aims to 
explain changes, referred to as events, in the behavior or being of an individual, 
organization, or some other collective, such as a state’s government. By examining which 
independent variables are associated with the given change over time, scholars gain an 
understanding of why and how the event is occurring (Berry and Berry 1990, 398). Berry 
and Berry apply event history analysis to policy diffusion by defining the event under 
consideration as the adoption of a particular policy, in their case state lotteries, and the 
entity undertaking the change as a state government. Although much of the literature 
focuses on the diffusion of public policies among states, event history analysis is also 
used to study the diffusion of policies between city and municipal governments (Rogers 
                                                          
7
 Walker used correlations to examine the relationship between state characteristics and policy innovation. 
He used a matrix of pair wise comparisons and a factor analysis to examine the spread of policies among 
regional groups.  
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and Peterson 2008; Shipan and Volden 2008) and the governments of different countries 
(Dolowitz and Marsh 1996).  
The introduction of event history analysis to the field of policy diffusion greatly 
improved the accuracy and scope of policy diffusion studies. The main advantage of 
using event history analysis is the ability to study the impact of variables that change over 
time. When using event history analysis, scholars are able to change the value of the 
variables being examined with each unit of time, usually a year (Berry and Berry 1990, 
399). Given that the value of many variables included in policy diffusion studies change 
drastically over time, especially if the time period under consideration spans decades, 
event history analysis allows for more accurate studies of policy diffusion. As Berry and 
Berry explain, with event history analysis, “It is not necessary to assume that a state 
adopting a program recently is affected by what its characteristics were when the first 
state adopted the program perhaps decades ago” (1990, 399). The ability to change 
variables’ values over time when using event history analysis plays a particularly 
important role in successfully bringing together the analyses of external and internal 
factors. While the actions of previous adopters cannot be easily accounted for in 
correlations, primarily due to the fact that this variable changes over time, event history 
analysis allows for statistical analysis of the impact of prior adoptions of other states on 
policy adoption. Being able to study the influence of both internal and external factors 
using a single statistical methodology insures more accurate results that are less prone to 
mistaken spurious relationships (Berry and Berry 1990, 399).  Thus, event history 
analysis, and in particular the opportunities it provides to study the impact of a wider 
diversity of factors, greatly improves the ability of scholars to study policy diffusion.  
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The Contemporary Policy Diffusion Literature 
 Since Berry and Berry introduced event history analysis as an effective method 
for studying policy diffusion, it has been used almost universally in the field. Most policy 
diffusion studies use this statistical methodology to either study the diffusion of a specific 
policy (Daley and Garand 2005; Stream 1999) as is the case with this particular study, or 
to demonstrate and emphasize the importance of a specific factor in the diffusion process 
(Balla 2001; Karch 2006; Mintrom 1997).  When considering the policy diffusion 
literature, a number of trends emerge, particularly in the variables that are usually 
included in the studies’ statistical analyses. Variables almost universally included in 
policy diffusion studies include socioeconomic characteristics, political system 
characteristics, variables which account for the context of the specific policy being 
studied, and variables which measure previous adoptions by other states. Throughout the 
rest of this section, I discuss these variables further, with a particular emphasis on why 
they are expected to have an impact on policy diffusion. The expected direction of the 
impact of these factors can be determined using Mohr’s theory. Generally speaking, if the 
factor measures an obstacle to policy adoption, it will be negatively associated with 
policy diffusion. Conversely, if a factor positively impacts the motivation to innovate or 
measures a resource for overcoming an obstacle to policy adoption, it will be positively 
associated with policy diffusion.  Since these factors impact policy diffusion generally, 






The Impact of Internal Factors 
 State socioeconomic characteristics and more specifically, a measure of state 
wealth, are almost universally included in policy diffusion analyses. State wealth is 
important as it represents a state’s slack resources, namely the resources that are freely 
available to the state to expend on new policies. If slack resources are available, a state is 
better equipped to undertake policy experimentation and the risks of policy failure (Karch 
2007a, 42; Walker 1969, 883). While slack resources have been measured in a number of 
different ways by different authors, the most commonly used measure today is state 
wealth. As a slack resource, financial wealth provides a state government with greater 
possibilities and opportunities in its policy decision-making (Allen et al. 2004, 324). 
Additionally, the cost of new policies can be a significant barrier to adoption, and state 
wealth is a key resource for overcoming this obstacle (Karch 2006, 405). Accordingly, 
state wealth is associated with state policy innovation (Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel 
2004, 324; Daley and Garand 2005, 618; Stream 1999, 515; Walker 1969, 883).   
 Just as wealth is strongly associated with policy diffusion, certain characteristics 
of a state’s political system are associated with policy adoption. These characteristics 
include the professionalism of the legislature, the degree of unified party control across 
the government, the prevailing ideology of the government’s leaders, the prevailing 
ideology of the government’s constituents, and the proximity of the next election. While 
the first two characteristics are resources for overcoming significant obstacles to policy 




 As was mentioned previously in the history section, a significant obstacle to 
policy adoption is a lack of information about the future effects of the policy. A key 
resource for overcoming this obstacle is information. Although information may be 
theoretically accessible to all of the states’ governments, states with more professional 
legislatures are better able to readily access and utilize this information (Karch 2007a, 43; 
McLendon, Heller, and Young 2005, 371). In the context of legislatures, professionalism 
refers to the extent to which the legislature holds the attributes of the U.S. Congress, 
namely extended sessions, high salaries, and large staffs (Karch 2006, 410; McLendon, 
Heller, and Young 2005, 371). The larger staff and time resources of a professional 
legislature allows the legislature to accumulate more information and knowledge about 
policies (Karch 2007a, 43). These features of a professional legislature also improve the 
overall legislative capacity of the government. In addition to informational constraints, 
legislatures face major time constraints. Legislators perform a wide variety of tasks and 
legislatures must formulate public policy in a number of different public policy areas. 
Accordingly, legislatures are pressed for time (Karch 2007a, 7-9). With more extensive 
staff resources and a longer period of time to consider public policies, professional 
legislatures are able to adopt a larger number of innovative policies (Karch 2007a, 43; 
McLendon, Heller, and Young 2005, 871; Walker 1969, 885).  
An additional resource for overcoming the obstacle of legislative time constraints is 
unified party control of the state’s government. Divided control of a state’s government, 
specifically of the legislative chambers and the governor, slows down the legislative 
process, as the two parties will inevitably disagree over policy decisions. By removing 
33 
 
roadblocks to legislative action, unified party control leads to the adoption of more public 
policies (Berry and Berry 1990; 403; McLendon, Heller, and Young 2005; 373).  
 While the above factors have measured resources for overcoming obstacles to 
policy innovation, characteristics of a state’s political system can also impact the 
motivation of legislators to innovate. A particularly important motivator for legislators is 
reelection (Mayhew 1974). To be reelected, legislators ought to adopt policies that 
correspond with the viewpoints and opinions of their constituents (Berry and Berry 1990, 
402). However, legislators are also motivated to improve public policy by their own 
conceptions of the public interest (Rosenthal 2009, 41). Altogether, a strong 
correspondence exists between popular opinion, the ideological orientation of legislators, 
and the passage of public policies (Berry et al. 1998, 327). Since adopting policies which 
align with both their personal and their constituents’ ideological beliefs is an important 
consideration for legislators, both public and governmental ideology impact a 
legislature’s motivation to adopt particular public policies (Allen, Pettus, and Haider-
Markel 2004, 325). Additionally, the ideological fit of a policy can be an important 
resource for overcoming the obstacle of uncertainty (Karch 2006, 410). Different policies 
are often associated with different ideologies and thus the direction of the impact of 
ideology on policy diffusion varies depending on the specific policy being considered 
(Karch 2006, 410). However, regardless of whether the policy is generally supported by 
liberals or conservatives, it is more likely to be adopted by governments controlled by 




While public opinion can be measured and studied as an independent factor in policy 
diffusion studies, the viewpoints of the public are often not expressed directly to 
legislators. Interest groups are an important mechanism through which constituents voice 
their opinions to the legislature (Rosenthal 2009, 140). As representatives of important 
interests, including the interests of constituents, interest groups have a notable impact on 
state policy making, particularly in the area of health care (Stream 1999, 508). Interest 
groups with large membership bases, strong opinions, and an important economic 
standing in the state are particularly effective (Rosenthal 2009, 147-9). Support for a 
policy from effective interest groups increases the likelihood that the policy will be 
adopted (Stream 1999, 508).  
In addition to underpinning the impact of constituent ideology and interest group 
activity on policy diffusion, legislators’ electoral concerns cause the proximity of 
elections to be an important factor in policy diffusion. In order to increase their chances 
of reelection, legislators tend to adopt policies at advantageous times within the election 
cycle (Berry and Berry 1990, 401). More specifically, politicians are more likely to adopt 
popular policies in an election year, while controversial policies tend to be adopted in 
non-election years (McLendon, Heller, and Young 2005, 373). Similarly to the last case, 
whether a policy is more likely to be adopted in an election or non-election year depends 
on its unique popularity. However, regardless of the popularity of the policy, proximity to 
an election year is likely to have an impact on policy diffusion.  
Another major determinant of the motivation to innovate is the perceived severity of 
the problem the policy is designed to address. One of the primary reasons for adopting a 
public policy is to address dissatisfaction or a problem with the current state of affairs 
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(Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 346; Karch 2006, 409). Generally speaking, of these 
problems, those which are severe, are perceived as particularly problematic, receive 
media attention, are salient, and are precipitated by large and significant events that bring 
attention to the problem are more likely to be addressed by the government (Allen, Pettus 
and Haider-Markel 2004, 325; Chamberlain and Haider-Markel 2005, 450; Karch 2006, 
409). Simply put, legislators are more likely to adopt a policy in states where the problem 
underlying the policy is more severe.  
 By impacting a state government’s motivation to innovate or by helping a state 
overcome the major obstacles to innovation of cost, time, and uncertainty, internal state 
socioeconomic and political system characteristics shape the diffusion of a variety of 
public policies. Since health insurance exchange policy is costly, complex, and 
controversial, these internal state characteristics are likely to have a significant impact on 
the diffusion of this particular policy. 
 
The Impact of External Characteristics 
External factors also play an important role in the process of policy diffusion. In 
particular, the adoption of a policy by one state can impact its diffusion among the other 
states. As was previously discussed, states tend to learn from the previous policy actions 
of other states in order to gain information about a policy’s potential effects. The 
information gleaned from other states helps the state overcome the uncertainty associated 
with adopting a new policy (Berry and Berry 1990, 400).  Although policy diffusion is 
usually perceived as a process of learning from other states, states may also compete 
economically with one another through the adoption of economically friendly policies 
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(Bergin 2011, 405) or feel pressured by one another to adopt policies. Regardless of the 
specific mechanism, previous adoption by other states is usually seen as a positive 
pressure encouraging further adoption (Daley and Garand 2005, 620). Previous adoption 
by another state can also be a resource for overcoming the obstacle of negative public 
opinion by providing concrete evidence of the positive effects of a policy (Berry and 
Berry 1990, 400; Karch 2006, 408).  
When the policy diffusion literature was initially developed, it was assumed that 
policies diffused among states in a regional manner. Indeed, “the significance of 
geographic proximity is a powerful theme in policy diffusion research, dating back to 
some of the earliest studies on the topic” (Karch 2007a, 41). This focus on geographic 
proximity is based on the assumption that lawmakers pay particular attention to the 
actions of neighboring states (Karch 2007a, 41). Several concrete mechanisms could 
explain this tendency on the part of states. These include stronger communication 
networks among policymakers in neighboring states, media markets which overlap 
several states, and the inclination of policymakers to learn from culturally, ideologically, 
and demographically similar states, which are likely to also be neighboring states (Karch 
2007b, 57). Although geographic proximity has been emphasized as an important factor 
in policy diffusion studies for decades, the empirical record provides a limited degree of 
support for its impact (Karch 2007b, 58). Additionally, given the realities of the modern 
world, the traditional view of diffusion as a process occurring in geographic clusters is 
limiting and outdated. In particular, as communication and travel have become easier, 
states are able to easily look at the policy decisions of any state in the country, regardless 
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of its geographic proximity (Shipan and Volden 2012, 789). A more nuanced view of 
policy diffusion needs to be adopted in response to these technological changes.  
Due to these concerns, contemporary policy diffusion studies often emphasize 
measures and mechanisms of policy diffusion besides geographic proximity (Karch 2006, 
405; Karch 2007b, 59). Some major alternative policy diffusion mechanisms include 
interstate professional organizations (Balla 2001), national organizations (Karch 2007b, 
65), policy networks (Mintrom and Vergari 1998), and policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom 
1997). Several policy diffusion scholars suggest that the impact of previous state policy 
adoption ought to be measured in an alternative way in order to account for the changing 
nature of communication in the modern world. Just as the traditional view of policy 
diffusion was founded upon the idea of closeness between states, in this case a 
geographic closeness, newer conceptions of policy diffusion also emphasize the closeness 
of states. However, instead of defining closeness as geographic proximity, scholars define 
closeness as ideological, political, demographic, economic, or budgetary similarity or as 
substantial economic and culture exchange (Karch 2007b, 59; Volden 2006, 299). By 
expanding the scope of interstate learning from neighboring states to the entire nation, 
these authors provide a more nuanced, contemporarily accurate measurement of policy 
diffusion. 
 
The Role of the Federal Government in Policy Diffusion 
 Although each state makes its own policy decisions, state decision-making 
doesn’t occur in a vacuum. As discussed in the previous section, states often learn from 
the experiences of other states as they consider public policies. However, in the United 
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States’ system of federalism, states are not only impacted by the actions of other states, 
but also by the actions of the national government. Accordingly, policy diffusion scholars 
have examined the important ways in which national government action impacts state 
policy diffusion for decades. For example, although their studies did not statistically 
examine the impact of national government action on policy diffusion, early scholars 
such as Walker and Virginia Gray hypothesized that the federal government impacts the 
state level diffusion of policies tied to federal grant money (Gray 1973, 1180; Walker 
1969, 895). Since these initial studies, scholars have further elucidated the relationship 
between national government action and state policy diffusion. Given the prominent role 
of the Affordable Care Act, a piece of federal legislation, in facilitating the adoption of 
health insurance exchanges by the states, understanding the relationship between national 
government action and state policy diffusion is key to understanding the diffusion of 
health insurance exchange policy.  
 The ability of the national government to impact the diffusion of state level policy 
can be explained, just as the impact of the variables discussed in the previous section 
were explained, using Mohr’s diffusion of innovations theory. As explained previously, 
factors which increase a state’s motivation to innovate, decrease the obstacles to 
innovation within a state, or increase the resources for overcoming these obstacles should 
have a positive impact on policy diffusion, while factors with the opposite effect should 
have a negative impact on policy diffusion. Through a number of different actions, the 
federal government can either encourage or discourage the diffusion of a public policy 
among the states by impacting either the obstacles to innovation, the resources for 
overcoming said obstacles, or the motivation to innovate.  
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Of the various ways in which the federal government can influence state 
government action, a policy mandate yields the strongest impact. Although federal policy 
mandates can take many forms, they all require states to enact or implement an 
innovative policy idea or incur a penalty (Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel 2004, 320; 
Karch 2006, 406). By creating a penalty for inaction, policy mandates increase a state’s 
motivation to innovate, as states will generally want to avoid incurring the penalty. 
Studies of previous federal government mandates, including a mandate to expand 
Medicaid coverage, demonstrate that government mandates have a positive impact on 
state policy diffusion (Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel 2004, 320).  
An action often, but not always, taken by the federal government in conjunction 
with policy mandates is the provision of financial incentives to states. As a means of 
encouraging state adoption of a given policy, the federal government often provides 
funding to help cover the costs of the policy. If the state chooses not to enact the policy, it 
foregoes receiving these federal funds (Karch 2006, 406). As discussed earlier, a major 
obstacle to the adoption of new policies is their cost. By providing states with funds for a 
given policy, the federal government gives states the resources needed to overcome one 
of the largest obstacles to policy adoption. The results of a few studies confirm this 
relationship. These studies show that a link between federal financial incentives and a 
faster rate of policy diffusion exists (Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel 2004, 326; Karch 
2006, 206; McGaughey and Mank 2001, 204).  
 Although policy mandates and financial incentives have the strongest impact on 
state policy diffusion, more subtle forms of national government action, such as policy 
signals, can also impact state policymaking. Policy signals are indications that the federal 
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government gives states concerning its policy preferences. These signals may come from 
Congress, the executive branch, or the judiciary and can take many different forms, 
including statutes, executive orders, court decisions, simple public statements by 
government leaders, and even a lack of national government action (Allen, Pettus, and 
Haider-Markel 2004, 321; Karch 2006, 406-7). Since policy signals don’t directly 
penalize states for not adopting a policy or reward states for policy adoption, policy 
signals have a less direct impact on state action than federal mandates and financial 
incentives. Studies have shown that policy signals and in particular strong and clear 
policy signals have an impact on state policy diffusion (Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel 
2004, 336; Karch 2006, 418). Federal policy signals have an impact on state government 
action in much the same way that the actions of other states impact a state government’s 
action. Just as prior adoption of a given policy by another state provides states with vital 
information about the policy, federal government support for a policy provides 
information to states. Given that uncertainty about a policy’s impact is a major obstacle 
to policy innovation, the information about a policy gleaned from the federal government 
by the states is a resource for overcoming this obstacle to innovation (Grossback, 
Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson 2004, 356). Accordingly, when the federal government 
endorses a specific policy, state governments tend to adopt the policy (Allen, Pettus, and 
Haider-Markel 2004, 321). Furthermore, federal support of a policy can be used by either 
state government leaders or interest groups to help garner public support for the policy 
(Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel 2004, 321). Given the importance of reelection to 
legislators, increased public support for a policy will increase the motivation of 
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legislators to adopt said policy. In these two ways, federal policy signals impact on the 
diffusion of policies among the states.  
 The federal government significantly impacts state government action through the 
use of policy mandates, grants, and policy signals. By penalizing the state for inaction or 
by providing the state with financial and informational resources, the federal government 
can encourage state policy adoption. In the case of health insurance exchange policy, the 
federal government took a number of these steps to strongly encourage state action on 
this issue.  
 
The Health Policy Diffusion Literature 
 Although similar variables play a role in the diffusion of a broad range of policies, 
the diffusion of each policy is a unique process. Public policies are widely varied in their 
goals and the strategies they use to accomplish these goals and accordingly, the process 
of policy diffusion varies depending on the type of policy. Policy diffusion research 
indicates that the factors which affect the diffusion of certain types of policy do not 
impact other policy areas. For example, studies demonstrate that the factors which impact 
the diffusion of morality policies, like abortion policies, are different than the factors 
which impact the spread of economic policies (Karch 2006, 408). Furthermore, the policy 
diffusion literature suggests that the relative innovativeness of states varies depending on 
the type of policy, with certain states being early adopters in some policy areas and late 
adopters in other areas (Karch 2006, 408). Due to this variation in the policy diffusion 
process, the results of my study are likely to be most similar to other studies examining 
the diffusion of health policies. Therefore, the health care policy diffusion literature 
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provides a further indication of which factors are most likely to play a role in the 
diffusion of health insurance exchange policy. Within the health care policy diffusion 
literature, Christopher Stream’s study of the diffusion of small group health insurance 
market reforms among the states (1999) is the closest approximation to this study. 
Accordingly, his findings are particularly significant for this study.  
 The existing literature on the diffusion of health care and social welfare policy 
indicates that a number of factors specifically play a role in the diffusion of these types of 
policy. One of the factors impacting the diffusion of social welfare policy generally is the 
political culture of a state.  Daniel Elazar develops a system of three different political 
cultures based upon a state’s values and beliefs concerning the purpose of government. 
Although a state may be influenced by more than one political culture, the three major 
political cultures are moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic. States with moralistic 
political cultures generally view intervention in income redistribution and economic 
affairs as the necessary and proper role of government. Conversely, in states with 
traditionalistic political cultures, governmental involvement in social welfare policy is 
limited as private charities and churches are considered the primary providers of social 
welfare services. Finally, the individualistic political culture focuses on personal 
responsibility and individual freedom. As a result, states with this political culture tend to 
help disadvantaged groups by decreasing barriers to personal opportunity as opposed to 
redistributing resources (McGaughey and Mank 2001, 205). Since states with these three 
political cultures hold vastly different beliefs about the proper role of the government in 
social welfare policy, the legislators in states with certain political cultures are more 
motivated to adopt social welfare policies, such as health reform policies, than legislators 
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in other states (McGaughey and Mank 2001, 205).  Although the direction of the impact 
of political culture on policy diffusion depends on the specific policy being consideration, 
generally states with a moralistic political culture are most likely to adopt social welfare 
policies, especially redistributive policies, while states with a traditionalistic political 
culture are least likely to adopt these policies.  
 While political culture plays a role in the diffusion of social welfare policies 
generally, other factors only play a role in the diffusion of health care policies and even 
more specifically, health insurance reform policies. One of these variables is the strength 
of the existing health insurance regulatory structure. Regulating the health insurance 
industry, especially in the context of implementing a complex, comprehensive reform 
policy, requires considerable resources. Thus, states with a history of strong regulation of 
the health insurance industry and large, established health insurance regulatory agencies 
in the bureaucracy are more likely to be able to effectively and successfully implement 
further insurance market reforms (Stream 1999, 210). More specifically, the expertise and 
large number of regulatory staff in these states are slack resources that can be used to 
overcome the cost of adopting further reform legislation.  Accordingly, large state 
insurance regulatory bureaucracies are associated with the adoption of further health 
insurance market reform policies (Stream 1999, 210).  
 These variables, namely political culture and the strength of existing regulatory 
frameworks, interact with the variables discussed in earlier sections of this chapter to 
shape the process of health policy diffusion. The existing health policy diffusion research 
and in particular Stream’s study of the diffusion of small group health insurance market 
reforms indicates which of these factors are likely to impact the diffusion of health 
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insurance exchange policy. Based on the findings of Stream’s study, the health insurance 
regulatory environment, state wealth, the degree of problem severity, and previous 
adoption by other states significantly impact health policy diffusion, while interest group 
activity has a negligible impact (Stream 1999, 512-4).  
 
Conclusion 
 Over the past few years, an increasing number of state across the country adopted 
health insurance exchange legislation. The spread of this policy among the states is an 
example of policy diffusion at work (Shipan and Volden 2012, 793). The diffusion of any 
policy, including health insurance exchange policy, is a complex process with a diverse 
array of factors playing a role in each state’s decision to adopt or not adopt the policy. 
Despite this complexity, the policy diffusion literature provides a clear theoretical 
structure for understanding how and why various factors have an impact on policy 
diffusion. Mohr theorizes that an organization’s tendency to innovate is negatively 
associated with obstacles to innovation and is positively associated with the 
organization’s motivation to innovate and their resources for overcoming the obstacles to 
innovation. Mohr’s understanding of innovative decision-making was applied to state 
policy decision making by Berry and Berry, creating the contemporary policy diffusion 
literature. Contemporary policy diffusion scholars explain the impact of a wide variety of 
factors on policy diffusion using Mohr’s theory. By either impacting a state’s motivation 
to innovate, its obstacles to innovation, or by providing resources for overcoming these 
obstacles, state wealth, legislative professionalism, the degree of unified party control in 
the state’s government, the ideological views of both government leaders and citizens, the 
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proximity of the next election, the severity of the problem the policy is designed to 
address, the actions of both other states and the national government, interest group 
action, political culture, and the strength of existing regulatory structures impact the 





































Chapter 4: Methodology 
Introduction 
 Over the past two years, as part of implementing the Affordable Care Act, each 
state created their own health insurance exchange, partnered with the federal government 
to create a health insurance exchange, or allowed the federal government to create an 
exchange on their behalf. My study examines the states’ health insurance exchange 
implementation decisions with the aim of providing some insights into why certain states 
created their own exchanges while others did not and how health insurance exchange 
policy spread among the states. These insights are gained by examining the rate of policy 
diffusion and the impact of several independent variables on this diffusion. My selection 
of independent variables is strongly informed by the policy diffusion literature and 
Mohr’s theory of the determinants of innovation. More specifically, variables which 
measure or impact the state government’s motivation to adopt health insurance exchange 
policy, obstacles to adoption, or the resources available to overcome these obstacles are 
included in the analysis. Although the results of my study will not provide a causative 
explanation for health insurance exchange policy diffusion, they will provide a better 
understanding of the exchange policy diffusion process. 
 While event history analysis is the branch of statistics used for this study, I 
specifically use the Kaplan-Meier estimator and the Cox proportional hazards regression 
model. In the first section of this chapter, I explain how and why I am using the Kaplan-
Meier estimator and Cox models in my research. Next, I outline the dependent variable 
and independent variables used in the analysis. For each variable, I explain why it is 
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being included in the analysis, how it is measured, and the impact I expect it to have on 
policy diffusion. 
 
Statistical Methods  
 To examine states’ health insurance exchange policy decisions and the potential 
determinants of these decisions, I use event history analysis, the standard statistical 
method for policy diffusion studies. As was discussed earlier in chapter 3, Berry and 
Berry first applied event history analysis to the study of state policy diffusion. Since then, 
almost all policy diffusion studies have used this technique. Originally developed within 
the field of biology, event history analysis examines “the patterns and correlates of the 
occurrences of events” (Yamaguchi 1991, 1). In the context of my study, the examined 
events are adoptions of a state run or partnership health insurance exchange by states.  
Event history analysis models function by examining the hazard rate, or the 
probability that an event being studied will occur at a particular time interval (Mills 2011, 
1).  In this particular study, the hazard rate is the probability that a state will adopt a state 
run or partnership health insurance exchange in a particular month.  Stated differently, 
event history analysis examines the length of time before a particular event occurs 
(Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 2004, 1). In this study, event history analyses examine the 
length of time between the beginning of the observation period and policy adoption. The 
hazard rate and the time period between the beginning of the study and policy adoption 
can be examined using nonparametric, semiparametric, or parametric analysis. The three 
types of analysis differ in how much they assume about the data prior to analysis. In a 
nonparametric analysis, the data is allowed to speak for itself as no assumptions are made 
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about how the hazard rate changes over time or about how independent variables impact 
the hazard rate (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 2004, 5; Mills 2011, 11). In contrast, in 
parametric analyses, the researcher makes assumptions about the hazard rate and the 
impact of independent variables in advance (Mills 2011, 14). Finally, in semiparametric 
analyses, the impact of independent variables is assumed to take a particular form, while 
no assumptions are made about the hazard rate (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 2004, 5). 
Due to the difficulty of making assumptions about the hazard rate, I complete 
nonparametric and semiparametric analyses in this study.  
Many event history analyses begin with nonparametric analysis, since 
nonparametric analyses are simpler and more straightforward. I follow suit and complete 
a nonparametric analysis using the Kaplan-Meier estimator. The Kaplan-Meier estimator 
estimates the values of the survivor function over time. The survivor function is the 
probability that the event being studied will not occur in a given time period (Cleves, 
Gould and Gutierrez 2004, 93). In the context of this study, the survivor function is the 
probability that a state will not adopt a health insurance exchange in a given month. 
While the hazard rate and the survivor rate both measure the phenomenon of state 
exchange policy adoptions, the hazard rate specifically measures the likelihood of 
adoption and the survivor function specifically measures the likelihood of inaction.  
Unfortunately, in my study, the terms survivor function and hazard rate are ill-
fitting. Describing state policy adoption as a hazard and a lack of state action as survival 
is confusing and counterintuitive. However, the terms hazard rate and survivor rate were 
originally developed in the field of biostatistics. In biological settings, event history 
analysis is usually used to examine mortality and health outcomes (Box-Steffensmeier 
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and Jones 2004, 7). When the event under consideration is death, the terms hazard rate 
and survival function are quite appropriate. Unfortunately, as event history analysis has 
been applied to the social sciences, this terminology has become confusing. As a 
reminder, in the context of this study, “survival” refers to a lack of state action, while the 
hazard rate refers to the “hazard” of state policy adoption. 
The estimated survivor function provided by the Kaplan-Meier estimator shows 
how quickly the policy is spreading among the states. A drop in the value of the survivor 
function over time indicates that a state or several states have adopted the policy. Thus, a 
large drop in the value of the survivor function indicates that the policy is diffusing at a 
fast rate. Conversely, if there is a small drop in the value of the survivor function, the 
policy is diffusing at a slower rate. Similar findings can be gleaned from an examination 
of the value of the hazard rate over time. When examining the hazard rate, the 
relationship between the change in the hazard rate and the speed of diffusion is simply 
reversed.  An examination of either the survivor function or hazard rate over time 
indicates how rapidly the given policy is diffusing. The Kaplan-Meier estimator can also 
be used to compare the diffusion of a policy among different groups of states. After 
grouping states using a categorical variable, the survivor functions of each of these 
groups can be estimated and compared (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 2004, 101). I use 
this methodology to examine the relationship between particular categorical variables and 
the speed of health care exchange policy diffusion.  
While the Kaplan-Meier estimator provides a sense of the temporal spread of 
health insurance exchange policy adoption, it is not possible to examine the impact of 
independent variables on policy diffusion using this type of analysis. To analyze the 
50 
 
impact of a variety of independent variables on the adoption of health insurance exchange 
policy, I utilize the Cox proportional hazards regression model, the most commonly used 
semiparametric model. As a semiparametric model, the Cox model has the advantage that 
it allows the impact of independent variables to be considered without requiring changes 
in the hazard rate to be determined in advance (Mills 2011, 14; Cleves, Gould, and 
Gutierrez 2004, 121). The Cox model elucidates the relationship between independent 
variables and policy diffusion by determining the impact of each variable on the hazard 
rate over time. This impact is measured using the hazard ratio, which is the ratio of the 
hazard rate when the variable is at a higher level to the baseline hazard rate (Cleves, 
Gould, and Gutierrez 2004, 123-4). For example, if the hazard ratio of a given variable is 
1.25, then the hazard rate will be 125% of its base value when the value of said variable 
is higher (Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 2004, 169).  
I also use the Cox model to determine the independent impact of each variable on 
health insurance exchange policy diffusion. The direction and statistical significance of 
each variable’s impact is determined by running a Cox model including only one variable 
at a time. Although not entirely analogous, these single variable Cox models function 
similarly to bivariate correlational analyses. Finally, I develop and analyze 
comprehensive Cox models which include a number of independent variables. These 
larger, comprehensive models describe the diffusion process more accurately, as they 
examine the impact of many variables concurrently. Through these models, the direction 
and statistical significance of each variable’s impact can be determined. Another 
important aspect of these models is their chi-square values. In this context, chi-square 
measures the predictive ability of the model. Thus, models with high chi-square values 
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better explain the phenomenon of health insurance exchange diffusion than those with 
lower chi-square values. The chi-square values of both the single variable and 
multivariable Cox models further indicate which variables have a particularly significant 
impact on the diffusion process.  
 
Variables and Hypotheses 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study is the hazard rate or in this context, the 
probability that a state will decide to create either a state-based health insurance exchange 
or a federal partnership exchange in a given time period. However, since probabilities 
cannot be observed and measured, a dummy variable is used to indicate whether a state 
has or has not decided to create a health insurance exchange during a given period.  This 
dummy variable is coded as a 0 or a 1, with a 1 indicating that the state decided to create 
either a state run or partnership health insurance exchange and a 0 indicating that the state 
has not yet made this decision. Given the short time frame of this study, I measure time in 
months. Beginning with the passage of the ACA in March 2010 and ending with the 
Department of Health and Human Services’ decision deadline in December 2012, the 
study includes 34 months in total. The time at which a state decided to create a health 
insurance exchange was obtained from the Kaiser Family Foundation’s State Exchange 
Profiles (2013b). For states that either passed legislation or issued an executive order 
creating a health insurance exchange before December 2012, the date on which the 
legislation or executive order was signed was used. For states that did not pass legislation 
or issue an executive order before December 2012, the date on which the governor 
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declared the state’s intent to create an exchange to the Federal Department of Health and 
Human Services was used.   
 
Independent Variables 
 I draw on Mohr’s theory of the diffusion of innovations to select appropriate 
independent variables for inclusion. The policy diffusion literature indicates that internal 
socioeconomic characteristics, internal political system characteristics, the external 
actions of other states and the Federal government and the context of the policy 
significantly impact the process of policy diffusion. Accordingly, I include these types of 
variables in my analysis.  
  
I. State Wealth: Although the federal government is helping to alleviate the cost of 
creating a health insurance exchange for states through grant money (Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2012a, 4), there are still significant initial and ongoing costs associated with 
setting up and running a health insurance exchange. Thus, I hypothesize that wealthier 
states are more likely to create their own health insurance exchanges. For this study, I 
developed three different measures of state wealth. Each of these measures defines state 
wealth in a slightly different way. My first measure of state wealth is the per capita 
personal income of residents of the state. Personal income is the income received by an 
individual from all income sources (U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 2012a). Since much of a state’s revenue is collected through taxes paid by 
citizens of the state and since many state taxes are income based, per capita personal 
income can be used to measure the wealth available to a state’s government. I gathered 
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personal per capita income data from the Council of State Governments’ Book of the 
States (Wall 2012a). However, per capita income is not direct measure of a state’s 
monetary resources. Given the variation in tax rates and structures among the states, a 
more direct measure of a state’s budget situation may be a better measure of state wealth. 
To measure a state government’s overall fiscal health, I used state revenue and 
expenditure data to calculate the percentage of a state’s expenditures that are directly paid 
for by revenue. If this percentage is high and particularly if it is higher than one hundred 
percent, the state is in a better financial position and is more likely to be able to afford a 
state run health insurance exchange. I also gathered state revenue and expenditure data 
from the Book of the States (Wall 2012d; Wall 2012e). Although a state may experience 
a positive relationship between revenue and expenditure in a given year, the positive 
relationship may not match historical trends in the finances of the state. Even if a state 
has additional revenue above the level of expenditures, additional revenues may be 
needed to pay off outstanding state debt. In order to account for the long term fiscal status 
of a state, I developed a measure of state debt. Using outstanding state debt data and 
population data, I calculated the share of a state’s debt in USD held by each resident of 
the state. The method of calculation controlled for the impact of population on 
outstanding state debt. I acquired state debt data from the Book of the States (Wall 
2012b) and population data from the U.S. Census Bureau (2012b). By measuring a state’s 
overall debt, this measure of state wealth accounts for the long term fiscal health of a 
state.  
 
II. Legislative Professionalism: Professional legislatures have greater resources and the 
capacity to consider more public policies in a particularly thorough manner. Because of 
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these characteristics, I expect these legislatures to be more likely to adopt health 
insurance exchange policy than less professional legislatures. To measure legislative 
professionalism, I use a measure originally developed by Peverill Squire (1992). His 
measure of legislative professionalism approximates how similar a given state legislature 
is to Congress in regards to member pay, staff members per legislator, and the total 
number of days in session (Squire 1992, 71). The level of this measure for each state is 
included in a table in Squire’s article (1992, 72).  
 
III. Unified Party Control: Given the extent to which divided control can slow down the 
workings of a government, I hypothesize that unified party control is correlated with 
health insurance exchange policy adoption. I measure unified party control using a 
dummy variable. This variable takes a value of 1 if the Senate, House, and Governor of a 
state are all controlled by the same political party and a value of 0 if this is not the case. 
Since the time period covered by this study, namely March 2010 to December 2012, 
includes several election cycles, the value of this variable changes over the course of the 
study to account for election results. Data on the party control of state legislatures is 
available from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL 2010; NCSL 2011) 
while data on the party control of governors is available from the National Governors 
Association (NGA 2010; NGA 2011; NGA 2012). 
 
IV. Ideology: Since the ACA was passed by a Congress controlled by and was signed by 
a President from the Democratic Party, an institution associated with liberal political 
ideologies, I expect states led by ideologically liberal governments to be more likely to 
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create a health insurance exchange than states led by conservative governments. I 
developed two different measures for the ideology of a state’s government. My first 
measure is based on the partisan control of the branches of a state’s government. The 
party control measure is a categorical variable which takes a value between 0 and 3 
depending on how many branches of the state’s government are controlled by the 
Democratic Party. However, the party control variable does not account for the relative 
size of the ruling majority in state legislatures.  For example, state legislatures controlled 
by a majority holding 75% of the total seats are likely to behave in different ways than 
legislatures controlled by a majority holding only 55% of the seats. Thus, my second 
measure of ideology is based on the percentage of legislative seats held by each party. 
More specifically, the legislature ideology measure is the percentage of the total available 
legislative seats at the federal and state levels held by the Democratic Party. I acquired 
information on the partisan makeup of state governments from the NCSL (NCSL 2010; 
NCSL 2011) and information on the partisan makeup of Congress from the U.S. 
Government Printing Office’s Congressional Directory (U.S. Government Printing Office 
2009; GPO 2011). As with the unified party control variable, the values of both ideology 
variables change over time to account for elections.  
 
V. Interest Group Influence: A wide variety of health policy interest groups, including 
doctor specialist associations, nurses associations, and large corporations, such as 
hospital organizations and health insurance companies, represent and lobby on behalf of 
the economic interests of specific subsets of the health industry. Since most health policy 
interest groups represent major economic interests who contribute significantly to state 
56 
 
economies, a health care interest group’s economic concentration in a state can be a 
major source of influence in the policy process (Stream 1999, 508). Accordingly, in his 
study of the diffusion of small group health insurance market reforms, Stream measures 
the influence of health industry and insurance industry interest groups on state policy 
decision making by measuring each industry’s share of the state’s total employment 
(1999, 508). In his study, Stream measures the influence of the health and insurance 
industries separately, as these industries have opposing views on the policies he 
examined. However, although health and insurance industry interest groups disagree on 
the specific features of the exchanges, a consensus in favor of state run, as opposed to 
federally run, health insurance exchanges has emerged. As a result, my study will 
measure the influence of health policy interest groups as a whole. Overall, I expect states 
in which the health and insurance industries make up a large percentage of total state 
employment to be more likely to create a state-run health insurance exchange. I calculate 
the percentage of a state’s total employment which is taken up by either the health 
industry or the insurance industry using data from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (2012b).  
 
VI. Proximity to Next Election: Since its passage, the ACA has been a controversial 
policy with a limited amount of public support. For example, a June 2012 poll found that 
only 34 percent of Americans approve of the law, while 48 percent disapprove of the law 
(De Pinto 2012). Given how controversial the ACA and its various reforms are among 
Americans, I expect state governments to avoid making a decision on health insurance 
exchanges immediately before an election. I measure proximity to the next election by 
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using a dummy variable. This variable takes a value of 1 if either the governor or 
legislature is up for reelection in the same calendar year of the given month. If no 
election is occurring that calendar year, the variable is coded as 0. The variable is also 
coded as 0 in November and December of the year of the elections since US elections 
occur the first week of November. Data on the timing of state legislative and 
gubernatorial elections is available through the Book of the States (Wall 2012c; Wall 
2012f). 
  
VII. Political Culture: As was discussed in the previous chapter, social welfare policies, 
such as health reform policies, are more likely to be adopted in states with a moralistic 
political culture and are less likely to be adopted in states with a traditionalistic political 
culture, while states with an individualistic political culture fall somewhere in the middle 
(McGaughey and Mank 2001, 205). Since health insurance exchange policy is a type of 
social welfare policy, I expect states with a moralistic political culture to be the most 
likely to create a health insurance exchange. I also expect states with a traditionalistic 
political culture to be the least likely to create a health insurance exchange. To measure 
political culture, I use Daniel Elazar’s classification of the states into one of these three 
political cultures or a hybridization of two of these political cultures (1972). Throughout 
my study, I group states into the three major political cultures discussed above while 
ignoring hybrid political cultures in order to simplify the analysis.  
 
VIII. Severity of Problem: One of the major goals of the ACA and by extension one of 
the major goals of state health insurance exchanges is to reduce the number of uninsured 
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Americans. While the growing number of uninsured Americans is a nationwide problem, 
the distribution of the uninsured population across the nation is not even. Since legislators 
are particularly motivated to address severe problems, I hypothesize that a large 
uninsured population is correlated with health insurance exchange policy adoption. Using 
data acquired from the U.S. Census Bureau, I use the percentage of a state’s population 
without health insurance as a measure of the severity of the problem being addressed by 
this policy (2012a).   
 
IX. Strength of Existing Regulatory Structures: In addition to needing financial resources 
to effectively implement a health insurance exchange, a state also needs human resources. 
Regulating an industry as complex as the health insurance industry requires a strong 
bureaucratic agency with a significant number of staff members with expertise in this 
area. Thus, I expect state governments with a large preexisting insurance regulatory 
agency to be more likely to adopt health insurance exchange policy. I measure the size of 
a state’s insurance regulatory bureaucracy using the same measure as Stream (1999, 510). 
Using data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners on the staff size of 
different states’ departments of insurance and population data from the U.S. Census 
Bureau, I calculated the total number of full time staff at a state’s department of insurance 
per 100,000 people living in the state (Ananthapura 1995, 56; U.S. Census Bureau 
2012b). 
 
X. Regional Diffusion: Although the idea of regional policy diffusion has been sharply 
criticized in recent years, the factor’s long history within the literature necessitates 
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continued inclusion in policy diffusion analyses. Since states tend to learn from and 
emulate the policy decisions of other states, I hypothesize that prior adoption of health 
insurance exchange policies by nearby states will be correlated with adoption of the same 
policy in a given state. I will measure prior adoption by nearby states as the percentage of 
states in a given state’s U.S. Census region that have already created a health insurance 
exchange. There are currently four U.S. Census regions. Region 1 is the Northeast, region 
2 is the Midwest, region 3 is the South, and region 4 is the West. Using information on 
state health insurance exchange policy adoption from the Kaiser Family Foundation’s 
State Exchange Profiles (2013b) and a map of the U.S. Census regions (U.S. Census 
Bureau), I calculated this variable myself.  
 As I discussed in the previous chapter, the traditional conception of diffusion as a 
process that occurs in regional clusters has been sharply criticized. Contemporary policy 
diffusion scholars provide alternatives to regional diffusion by emphasizing alternative 
diffusion mechanisms such as interstate professional organizations and policy 
entrepreneurs and alternative measures of diffusion which group states based on cultural, 
ideological, or economic closeness (Balla 2001; Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, and 
Peterson 2004, 299; Karch 2007b, 59; Mintrom 1997; Volden 2006, 299). Unfortunately, 
many diffusion mechanisms are difficult to measure and effectively include within 
statistical analyses. For example, Mintrom sent a mail survey to hundreds of policy 
entrepreneurs to gather the information needed to effectively examine their impact on 
policy diffusion (1997). It can also be challenging to include alternative measures of 
diffusion in analyses. For example, although Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, and 
Peterson’s measure of the ideological closeness between states is theoretically sound, it is 
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also fairly complex (2004). Due to time limitations, I was unfortunately unable to include 
any of these alternative mechanisms and measurements of diffusion in my analysis.  
 
XI. National Government Grant Money: As was mentioned in the section on state wealth, 
the federal government has provided states with grant money to help alleviate the cost of 
creating a health insurance exchange. I expect that states that received larger grants will 
be more likely to create a health insurance exchange than states who receive smaller 
grants. I measure federal grant money as a single totaled number of all the grants a state 
has received up to that point for implementing a health insurance exchange, regardless of 
when the grants were received. I accessed data on the number and size of grants received 
by each state from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ website (USDHHS; 
USDHHS 2011b).  
  
XII. Market Competitiveness: Although private health insurance markets in different 
states operate in similar ways, there is wide variation in the competitiveness of the private 
small group and individual health insurance markets across the states. For example, in the 
state of Alabama, a single insurer controls 96% of the small group health insurance 
market while Oregon’s small group insurance market is controlled by seven major 
insurers, none of which control more than 24% of the market (KFF 2010b). Although the 
existing literature does not provide a clear indication of the effect insurance market 
competitiveness may have on public diffusion, I expect states with less competitive 
insurance markets to adopt state-based health insurance exchanges. In states with less 
competitive insurance markets, only a few insurers control large shares of the market. 
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Due to these large market shares, these insurance companies have a larger economic role 
in the state than their counterparts in states with more competitive insurance 
marketplaces. Since an interest group’s economic standing can impact its lobbying 
power, insurance companies with a larger economic share of the market are more likely 
to achieve their lobbying goals (Rosenthal 59 2009, 148). Insurance companies have 
generally favored state run insurance exchanges. Thus I expect states with less 
competitive insurance markets and accordingly stronger health insurance companies to be 
more likely to adopt a state run insurance exchange. To measure insurance market 
competitiveness, I use the Kaiser Family Foundation’s Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI). The HHI measures how evenly market share is spread across a large number of 
health insurers by taking the sum of squares of market share by state. The index is 
measured on a scale of 0 to 10,000. Higher HHI values indicate less competition while 
lower values indicate more competition (KFF 2010b). While the Kaiser Family 
Foundation calculated the HHI for the individual and small group markets separately, I 
have taken the mean of these two values to form a single measure of overall insurance 
market competitiveness (KFF 2010a; KFF 2010b). Overall, I expect states with higher 
HHI values to be more likely to adopt a state run health insurance exchange.  
 
XIV. Supreme Court Decision: Following the passage of the ACA, 26 states joined a 
lawsuit challenging the law’s constitutionality (KFF 2012b, 1). The lawsuit called into 
question the long term existence of the ACA by creating an opportunity for the legislation 
to be ruled unconstitutional. However, in June 2012 in the case National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius the Supreme Court ruled that the ACA, with the 
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exception of an element of its Medicaid expansion, is constitutional (KFF 2012b, 4). A 
number of states made the decision during the period between the ACA’s passage and the 
Supreme Court’s ruling to not move forward with implementation of the ACA, including 
the creation of health insurance exchanges, since there was a possibility the law could be 
overturned. Since the Supreme Court case was the final legal decision on this issue, I 
would expect the rate of health insurance exchange policy diffusion to increase 
immediately following the Supreme Court’s decision. In order to isolate the impact of 
this event from other independent variables, I did not include it in the Cox proportional 
hazards models. Instead, I analyzed the impact of this variable using nonparametric 
analyses. I began this process by splitting the entire data set into two groups. One group 
included data for the months prior to the Supreme Court decision while the other included 
data for the months after the Supreme Court decision. I then analyzed these two data sets 
independently using the Kaplan-Meier estimator and compared the results to ascertain the 




 Following the standard for policy diffusion studies, I use event history analysis to 
examine the diffusion of health insurance exchange policy. This branch of statistics 
allows scholars to study the patterns and correlates of events, such as policy adoptions. 
More specifically, I use the Kaplan-Meier estimator to examine the timing of health 
insurance exchange policy diffusion and both single variable and multivariable Cox 
proportional hazards regression models to examine the impact of independent variables 
on the diffusion process.  In the analyses, the hazard rate, defined as the probability that a 
state will adopt a health insurance exchange in a particular month, is the dependent 
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variable. My selection of independent variables for this study was strongly informed by 
the policy diffusion literature. The independent variables included in my analysis either 
directly measure or significantly impact state governments’ motivation to innovate, 
obstacles to state government innovation, or the resources available for overcoming these 
obstacles. Independent variables include internal state socioeconomic and political 
system characteristics, such as state wealth, legislative professionalism and political 
culture, and external factors, such as regional policy diffusion and federal grant money.  
Analysis using the methodology outlined in this chapter will provide valuable insights 
into the process of health insurance exchange policy diffusion and the impact of a variety 
















Chapter 5: Data Analysis 
The Diffusion of Health Insurance Exchange Policy 
 In the period between the passage of the Affordable Care Act in March 2010 and 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ state run exchange application 
deadline in December 2012, twenty four states and the District of Columbia decided to 
either run their own health insurance exchange or participate in a federal partnership 
exchange. The other twenty six states decided to allow the federal government to operate 
a health insurance exchange on their behalf. Each state’s decision in regards to this issue 
can be seen in Figure 1.8  
Despite the relative simplicity of the map, the routes states have taken to making 
this important public policy decision vary widely. Significant differences in both the 
timing of the decision and the governmental process through which the decision was 
made exist across the states. For example, California passed legislation creating a state 
run exchange a mere six months after the passage of the ACA in September 2010. 
Idaho’s governor announced the state would pursue a state run exchange only a few days 
before the final federal deadline in December 2012 (KFF 2013b). Particularly unique 
examples of this decision making process include Mississippi and Missouri. In 
Mississippi, the independently elected insurance commissioner decided to adopt a state 
run health insurance exchange without the support of the governor or the legislature.9 
Although Missouri’s governor had intended to create a state run exchange via executive  
                                                          
8
 This figure reflects the diffusion of this policy as of December 2012. Since then, Mississippi has defaulted 
to a federal exchange and New Hampshire has adopted a partnership exchange. 
9
 The insurance commissioner’s application to the federal government to create a state exchange was 
subsequently denied due to this lack of support from the state government. After the denial of this 
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order, he was forced by the referendum to forego this possibility. These examples 
demonstrate the diverse ways in which states’ decisions on health insurance exchange 
policy were made. A diverse array of factors underlies the unique decision each state 
made in response to the exchange requirements of the ACA. The findings outlined in this 
chapter help tease out the details of this complicated diffusion process.  
 
Nonparametric Analysis: Kaplan-Meier Estimator 
 As I explained in the previous chapter, I begin my analysis with a nonparametric 
analysis using the Kaplan-Meier estimator. By estimating the survivor function10, the 
Kaplan-Meier estimator provides a sense of the policy’s relative speed of diffusion. Large 
decreases in the survivor rate signify that the policy is diffusing at a faster rate at that 
particular time period than at other points of time in the study. Similarly, small decreases 
in the survivor rate signify that the policy is diffusing at a slower rate at that time period. 
The results of this analysis can be seen in table 1. In addition to presenting the survivor 
rate over time, this table shows the specific months when states made a decision 
concerning health insurance exchanges and how many states made this decision during 
that month. The relative speed of the diffusion process is also shown in figure 2, a graph 
of the hazard rate. Although large increases in the hazard rate indicate the policy is 
diffusing at a faster rate and small increases indicate the policy is diffusing at a slower 
rate, the hazard rate measures the same phenomenon as the survivor rate.  
 
 
                                                          
10
 As a reminder, in the context of this study, the survivor rate is the probability of state inaction, while the 




Table 1: Kaplan-Meier Survivor Function Estimate 
Month Number of Adoptions Survivor Function 
March 2010 2 .9608 
September 2010 1 .9412 
April 2011 1 .9216 
May 2011 2 .8824 
June 2011 3 .8235 
July 2011 2 .7843 
September 2011 1 .7647 
December 2011 2 .7255 
April 2012 1 .7059 
July 2012 4 .6275 
November 2012 3 .5686 
December 2012 3 .5098 
 
Number of adoptions refers to the number of states which adopted a state run or federal state partnership 
exchange during the given month. The survivor function is the probability that a state will not adopt a 
health insurance exchange during the given month. 
 
Figure 2: Hazard Function 
 
 
The hazard function is the probability that a state will adopt a state run or federal state partnership health 
insurance exchange during a given month. The analysis time refers to the month of the study, with 1 
referring to March 2010 and 34 referring to December 2012.  In this figure, the estimated hazard rates for 




The Kaplan-Meier estimates demonstrate that the adoption of health insurance 
exchange policy has occurred at an uneven rate over time, with faster rates of adoption 
during the late spring and summer months of 2011 and 2012 and during the two months 
immediately preceding the federal government’s deadline. This uneven rate of adoption is 
unsurprising considering the nature of legislative work. While there is certainly variation 
among the states in terms of the length and timing of legislative sessions, many states end 
their legislative sessions in late spring or early summer (NCSL 2013). Since complicated 
legislation, such as health insurance exchange legislation is often adopted at the end of a 
legislative session, legislative session scheduling is a likely cause for the summer spikes 
in adoption rates. Similarly, the likely cause for the higher adoption rates in the final few 
months of the study is the federal timeline for action placed upon states. In order to meet 
the requirements of the ACA, states needed to make a decision regarding health insurance 
exchanges before December 2012. Many states waited to make this decision as they 
weighed their options and in some cases, hoped a presidential victory for Mitt Romney 
would lead to complete repeal of the ACA (Goodnough 2012). Given these factors, it is 
unsurprising that many states decided to create health insurance exchanges in November 
and December of 2012. Overall, the Kaplan-Meier estimator provides a sense of the 
temporal diffusion of health insurance exchange policy. 
 
Single Variable Cox Proportional Hazards Regression Models 
 As was discussed in the previous chapter, I use both single variable and 
multivariable Cox proportional hazards regression models to examine the impact of 
independent variables on the adoption of health insurance exchange policy. I begin my 
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discussion of these models with the simpler single variable Cox models. To determine the 
independent impact of variables on health insurance exchange policy diffusion, I ran a 
separate single variable Cox model for each independent variable discussed in the 
previous chapter, with the exception of the Supreme Court decision (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Single Variable Cox Proportional Hazards Models 
Variable Hazard Ratio Standard Error Significance Chi Square 
Personal Income 1.004355 .001626 .007** 7.21 
Fiscal Health .9678664 .0331439 .34 .91 
Outstanding 
State Debt 
1.020284 .0100163 .041* 4.18 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
1.309303 .132992 .008** 7.04 
Unified Control .8618724 .3472322 .712 .14 
Democratic 
Party Control 
2.702152 .5003797 0.000*** 28.82 
Legislature 
Ideology 
1.067587 .0125241 0.000*** 31.08 
Interest Group 
Activity 
1.085252 .0899926 .324 .97 
Election 
Proximity 
.9520201 .2616493 .858 .03 
Political Culture 1.529015 .3468846 .061* 3.5 
Uninsured 
Population 
.8929808 .0570365 .076* 3.14 
Regulatory 
Agency Size 
.9065361 .1254388 .478 .5 
Regional 
Diffusion 
1.00417 .011626 .719 .13 
Federal Grant 
Money 
1.034632 .0120699 .004** 8.52 
Market 
Competitiveness 
.9943433 .0129109 .662 .19 
 
The dependent variable in all of the models is the hazard rate. Each variable listed in the left hand column 
is the independent variable in each model. The hazard ratio is the ratio of the hazard rate when the variable 
is at a higher level to the baseline hazard rate.  *significant at p<0.05; ** significant at p<0.005, *** 
significant at p<0.001 Chi square measures the predictive ability of the model. Models with higher chi 





Of the fifteen variables included in this study, eight of them had a statistically 
significant impact at the five percent level on health insurance exchange policy adoption. 
Most of these fifteen variables can be categorized as state socioeconomic characteristics, 
state political system characteristics, or external actions by other states or the federal 
government. While these variables are included in most policy diffusion studies (Allen, 
Pettus, and Haider Markel 2004; Karch 2006; McLendon, Heller, and Young 2005; 
Stream 1999), the remaining variables in this study are expected to only have an impact 
on the diffusion of health insurance exchange policy and other similar health policies 
(McGaughey and Mank 2001; Stream 1999). Of these categories of variables, most state 
socioeconomic characteristics, including state debt and personal income, some state 
political system characteristics, namely legislative professionalism, Democratic party 
control of the legislature and the ideology of the legislature, federal government action in 
the form of grants, and a few additional variables, such as the size of the uninsured 
population and political culture, had a significant impact on health insurance exchange 
policy diffusion.  
Furthermore, all but two of the eight statistically significant variables impacted 
policy diffusion in the expected direction. The direction of a variable’s impact is reflected 
in the value of the hazard ratio. If a variable’s hazard ratio is greater than one, the 
variable has a positive impact on the probability of adoption. Similarly, if a variable’s 
hazard ratio is less than one, said variable has a negative impact on the probability of 
adoption. In this study, all of the variables with the exception of state debt are expected to 
have a positive impact on health insurance exchange policy diffusion. Of the eight 
statistically significant variables, state debt and the size of the uninsured population 
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impact the probability of policy adoption in an unexpected direction. Although these 
results were not expected, these models’ use of only one variable and their limited 
predictive ability temper these findings.  
Overall, the results of the single variable Cox models indicate that the most 
important factors in determining whether a state creates a health insurance exchange are 
the resources available to a state, both financially in the form of tax revenues and federal 
grant money and in terms of personnel as measured by the legislative professionalism 
variable, and the motivation to innovate, as measured by the Democratic party control, 
legislature ideology, and political culture variables. However, when the chi-square values 
of these models are also taken into consideration, ideology and Democratic party control 
seem to be particularly important determinants of health insurance exchange policy 
adoption. As was discussed in the previous chapter, chi square measures the predictive 
ability of a model. Although the chi-square values for the models listed in Table 3 may 
seem low, the low chi-square values are expected. Given that each of the models only 
includes a single covariate, these models are unlikely to explain much of the phenomenon 
of policy diffusion. However, the chi square values of these models can be compared 
with one another to ascertain the most predictive determinant of policy diffusion. Given 
that most of the chi square values for these models are between zero and five, even 
among statistically significant variables, and given that the chi square values for the 
Democratic party control and ideology models are 28.82 and 31.08 respectively, ideology 
and Democratic party control seem to be especially strong determinants of health 




Multivariable Cox Proportional Hazards Regression Models 
 Although the results of single variable Cox proportional hazards regression 
models can be informative, I develop a model which includes several different covariates 
to fully understand the phenomenon of health insurance exchange policy diffusion.  
Accordingly, I developed several different models that included a significant number of 
independent variables. For the most part, all of these models included all of the 
independent variables discussed in the methods section and produced similar results. 
Different models were used to determine the best measure for state wealth (fiscal health, 
outstanding state debt, or personal income) and the best measure of government ideology 
(legislature ideology or Democratic party control). The strongest model included personal 
income and legislature ideology as independent variables. The results of this model can 
be seen in Table 4.  
Table 4: Cox Hazard Model Results 
Variable Hazard Ratio11 Standard Error Significance 
Personal Income 1.003133 .0056279 .577 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
.9594518 .1293424 .759 
Unified Control 3.489097 1.594715 .006** 
Legislature Ideology 1.132185 .0216436 0*** 
Interest Group Action 1.034624 .0976059 .718 
Election Proximity 1.10109 .3145843 .736 
Political Culture 6.072616 2.213996 0*** 
Uninsured Population 1.339032 .1287884 .002*** 
Regulatory Agency 
Size 
.6705346 .2190573 .221 
Regional Diffusion .995049 .0139395 .723 
Federal Grant Money 1.057693 .0116675 0*** 
Insurance Market 
Competitiveness 
1.024697 .0174572 .152 
The dependent variable is the hazard rate. The variables listed in the left hand column are the independent 
variables in this model. The hazard ratio is the ratio of the hazard rate when the variable is at a higher level 
to the baseline hazard rate.  *significant at p<0.05; ** significant at p<0.005, *** significant at p<0.001 
                                                          
11See footnote 1.  
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To a large extent, the results of the larger Cox proportional hazards model are 
similar to the results of the single variable models. Ideology, federal grant money, the 
size of the uninsured population, and political culture continue to have a statistically 
significant impact on health insurance exchange policy diffusion. However, the size of 
the uninsured population has an impact in the expected direction in the multivariable Cox 
model. The change in direction could be attributed to the more comprehensive and 
predictive nature of the larger model or to interactions and correlations among the 
covariates themselves. In either case, the direction of the uninsured population’s impact 
in the multivariable model corresponds with expectations while the variable’s reaction in 
the single variable model does not. Unified party control is also statistically significant at 
the five percent level in the multivariable model. All other variables in the multivariable 
Cox model do not have a statistically significant impact. 
 Of particular note in the results of the larger model is the continued importance of 
ideology as a determinant of policy diffusion. Due to the partisan makeup of the national 
government when the ACA was passed, the legislation and its effects, including the 
establishment of health insurance exchanges, have been strongly associated with the 
Democratic Party. Thus, the finding that state governments controlled by the Democratic 
Party are more likely to create state run or federal partnership exchanges is entirely 
expected. I also suspect that the unified party control variable’s statistically significant 
impact in the larger model is in part a result of this variable’s interaction with the 
ideology variable. Given the large degree to which a state government’s partisan makeup 
predicts its health insurance exchange policy decision, the unified control variable ought 
to have a middling impact when it is studied independently of other variables, given that 
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it codes for state governments entirely controlled by either the Republican Party or the 
Democratic Party.  However, in a larger model in which the impact of a state 
government’s ideology is accounted for, this variable is likely to have a statistically 
significant impact as governments with unified Democratic control should be more likely 
than divided governments to adopt health insurance exchange policy. Thus, I doubt that 
unified party control has much of an impact on health insurance exchange policy 
diffusion outside of its interaction with ideology and party control.  
 Although Democratic Party control of the state government appears to be a 
particularly strong predictor of a state’s decision to adopt a state run or partnership health 
insurance exchange, this variable does not account for the decision of some traditionally 
Republican states, such as Utah and Idaho, to create state run health insurance exchanges. 
I suspect that political culture may explain the decision of these and similar states to 
enact health insurance exchange policy. Based on the characteristic viewpoints of the 
three political cultures, I expect states with moralistic political cultures to be more likely 
than states with traditionalistic or individualistic political cultures to adopt health 
insurance exchange policy. Given that political culture is a statistically significant 
variable in both the single variable and multivariable Cox models and given that Utah is 
an archetypal example of a state with a moralistic political culture (Elazar 1972), I would 
argue that political culture accounts for the decision of many traditionally Republican 
states to adopt health insurance exchange policy. Analysis using the Kaplan-Meier 
estimator of the different survival rates of states with moralistic, individualistic and 
traditionalistic political cultures further supports this argument. The results of this 
analysis can be seen in Figure 3. As a reminder, in the context of this study, the survivor 
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rate is the probability that a state will not adopt health insurance exchange policy. 
Accordingly, decreases in the survivor rate and in particular significant decreases in the 
survivor rate indicate that the policy is diffusing. In Figure 3, the survival rates of states 
with a moralistic political culture (politicalculturegroup=1), states with an individualistic 
political culture (politicalculturegroup=2) and states with a traditionalistic political 
culture (politicalculturegroup=3) are compared. The earlier and more significant drops in 
the survivor rate for states with either a moralistic or an individualistic political culture 
indicate that these states are significantly more likely to adopt health insurance exchange 
policy than states with traditionalistic political cultures. Taken together, the results of this 
analysis and the results of both the single variable and multivariable Cox models indicate 
that political culture plays an important role in the diffusion of health insurance exchange 
policy. 
Figure 3: Kaplan-Meier Survivor Rate Estimates by Political Culture 
 
 
The survivor rate is the probability that a state will not adopt a health insurance exchange during the given 
month. Political culture group 1 is formed of states with a moralistic political culture, political culture 
group 2 is formed of states with an individualistic political culture, and political culture group 3 is formed 
of states with a traditionalistic political culture.  
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Another variable that was statistically significant in both the individual variable 
and multivariable Cox models is federal grant money.  Despite this variable’s statistically 
significant impact and despite the important role of grants in making state run insurance 
exchanges more affordable for states, I am skeptical of the causal impact of grant money 
on policy diffusion. Federal grant money for health insurance exchanges was given to 
states through an application process (USDHHS 2011a). States who applied for grants 
through the federal government were perhaps more inclined to adopt a state run or 
partnership health insurance exchange, as the grant application process is designed to 
provide money for this purpose. If states who applied for grant money were already more 
likely to adopt a health insurance exchange than states who did not apply for grant 
money, the link between health insurance exchange policy adoption and federal grant 
money may be correlation, as opposed to causational. 
The final variable with a statistically significant impact in both the single and 
multivariable models is the size of the uninsured population. Although the change in the 
direction of the variable’s impact between the two models is somewhat disconcerting, the 
statistical significance of the size of the uninsured population in both models indicates 
that this variable plays a role in the diffusion process. Fundamentally, health insurance 
exchanges and the other reforms of the ACA are aimed at reducing the number of 
uninsured Americans. Given that the number of uninsured Americans has steadily 
increased for decades, reaching 48 million in 2011 (U.S. Census Bureau 2012a), and 
given that these individuals and families face the enormous burden of paying for their 
medical care out of pocket, a burden which often leads to foregoing medical care (Kaiser 
Family Foundation Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2012), it is not 
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surprising that legislators will adopt policies to address this issue, particularly if the size 
of the uninsured population in their state is large. Although the impact of the size of the 
uninsured population on health insurance exchange policy adoption is less supported than 
the impact of either legislature ideology or political culture, the multivariable Cox model 
still indicates that the size of the uninsured population plays a role in the diffusion 
process.  
Clearly, a large number of independent variables included in this analysis did not 
have a statistically significant impact in either the multivariable Cox model or in the 
single variable Cox model. Some of these variables may truly not play a role in the 
diffusion of health insurance exchange policy. However, many of the variables with a 
statistically insignificant impact were weakened by measurement limitations. In 
particular, I found interest group activity and the size of the existing regulatory agency 
difficult to accurately measure. In many policy diffusion studies, the impact of interest 
groups is measured using the size of the membership in relevant citizen interest groups. 
For example, studies examining the diffusion of environmental policy often use 
membership in the Sierra Club as the basis for their measure of interest group activity 
(Daley and Garand 2005, 626). However, since interest group activity in the area of 
health policy is dominated by professional associations and corporations, an equivalent 
measure based on citizen group membership does not exist. While my chosen measure 
does provide a sense of the relative economic importance of the health care and insurance 
sectors, I find it to be a rather crude measure of interest group activity. Additionally, I 
found it challenging to accurately measure the size of the existing regulatory agency. 
Although data on the size of these agencies exists, it dates from 1995. The size of state 
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bureaucracies may very well have changed over this time period. Given this possibility, I 
am somewhat skeptical of the contemporary accuracy of this variable. Both interest group 
activity and the size of the existing insurance regulatory bureaucracy were statistically 
significant factors in Stream’s similar study of health insurance market reform policy 
diffusion (1999).  Based on Stream’s results, I am hesitant to dismiss the potential impact 
of these factors on health insurance exchange policy diffusion. Further health insurance 
exchange policy diffusion studies ought to reexamine the impact of these variables using 
more accurate measurement techniques.  
Of the independent variables without a statistically significant impact on health 
insurance exchange policy diffusion, the case of the regional diffusion variable is of 
particular note. There are a significant number of scholars who are understandably 
critical of the idea of regional policy diffusion. They argue that technological 
advancements have allowed states to learn from the policy decisions of other states 
independently of the states’ geographic proximity. However, in the case of health 
insurance exchange policy diffusion, the geographic distribution of the states with state 
run or partnership health insurance exchanges appears to be quite regional. While many 
states in the West and the Northeast have adopted state run health insurance exchanges, 
few states in the South and Midwest have adopted exchange policy. A comparison of the 
survival rates of the states in each Census region (West, Midwest, Northeast, and South) 
using the Kaplan-Meier estimator supports this perception. As can be seen in figure 4, 
states in Census region 1 (Northeast) and Census region 4 (West) are much more likely to 
create a state run or partnership health insurance exchange than states in Census region 2 
(Midwest) or Census region 3 (South). These results would seem to indicate that regional 
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diffusion ought to have a role in health insurance exchange policy diffusion. However, 
the regional geographic distribution of the states that have adopted health insurance 
exchange policies may be due to other underlying common characteristics, such as 
ideology and political culture. 
Figure 4: Kaplan-Meier Survival Rate Estimates by Census Region 
 
 
The survivor rate is the probability that a state will not adopt a health insurance exchange during the given 
month. Census region 1 is formed of states in the Northeast Census region, Census region 2 is formed of 
states in the Midwest Census region, Census region 3 is formed of states in the South Census region, and 
Census region 4 is formed of states in the West Census region. 
 
 
The Impact of the Supreme Court Decision 
 As was discussed in the methodology chapter, I expect states to be more likely to 
adopt health insurance exchange policy after the Supreme Court decision in NFIB v. 
Sebelius than before this decision. I analyzed the impact of this decision independently 
from the Cox models in order to isolate its effects. As I explained in the previous chapter, 
I split my data set into a period before and a period after the Supreme Court decision and 
then compared the survivor rates of these two data sets. Tables 5 and 6 and figures 5 and 
6 show the results of this analysis. 
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Table 5: Kaplan-Meier Survivor Function Estimate before Supreme Court Decision 





March 2010 51 2 ,9608 
September 2010 49 1 .9412 
April 2011 48 1 .9216 
May 2011 47 2 .8824 
June 2011 45 3 .8235 
July 2011 42 2 .7843 
September 2011 40 1 ,7647 
December 2011 39 2 .7255 
April 2012 37 1 .7059 
May 2012 36 0 .7059 
 
Number of adoptions refers to the number of states which adopted a state run or federal state partnership 
exchange during the given month. The survivor function is the probability that a state will not adopt a 
health insurance exchange during the given month. 
 
 
Figure 5: Kaplan-Meier Survivor Estimate before Supreme Court Decision 
 
 
The survivor function is the probability that a state will not adopt a health insurance exchange during the 
given month. The analysis time refers to the month of the study, with 1 referring to March 2010 and 34 











Table 6: Survivor Function after Supreme Court Decision 
Month Number of States 
Remaining 
Number of Adoptions Survivor 
Function 
July 2012 36 4 .8889 
November 2012 32 3 .8056 
December 2012 29 3 ,7222 
 
Number of adoptions refers to the number of states which adopted a state run or federal state partnership 
exchange during the given month. The survivor function is the probability that a state will not adopt a 
health insurance exchange during the given month. 
 
Figure 6: Kaplan-Meier Survivor Estimate after Supreme Court Decision 
 
 
The survivor function is the probability that a state will not adopt a health insurance exchange during the 
given month. The analysis time refers to the month of the study, with 1 referring to March 2010 and 34 
referring to December 2012.   
 
 In comparing the process of health insurance exchange policy diffusion before 
and after the Supreme Court’s decision on the constitutionality of the ACA, diffusion 
after the Supreme Court decision tended to progress at a faster rate than before the 
decision. While the survivor function, defined as the probability of not adopting the 
policy, dropped from .9608 to .7059 over the course of 27 months before the Supreme 
Court decision, in the period after the Supreme Court decision, the survivor function 
dropped from .8889 to .7222 in only six months. Additionally, while 15 states created a 
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state run or partnership health insurance exchange in the 27 months before the Supreme 
Court decision, an additional 11 states created a state run or partnership exchange in the 6 
months following the Supreme Court’s decision. Altogether, these findings indicate that 
the diffusion of health insurance exchange policy occurred at a faster rate after the 
Supreme Court decision than it did before the decision. However, this may be a 
correlational relationship as opposed to a causational relationship. The rate of policy 
diffusion was also probably higher after the Supreme Court’s decision due to the national 
government’s ensuing December 2012 deadline. More investigation is needed to 
determine the cause of this trend in the rate of health insurance exchange policy 
diffusion.  
 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 This study’s statistical analysis of the diffusion of health insurance exchange 
policy began with a nonparametric analysis using the Kaplan-Meier estimator. By 
estimating the survivor rate, the Kaplan-Meier estimator provides a sense of the relative 
speed of diffusion over the time period being studied. The results of this analysis show 
that health insurance exchange policy did not diffuse at a uniform rate over the time 
period of study. More specifically, the diffusion rate was at its highest during the late 
spring and summer months and the last few months of the study. This analysis both 
confirms the tendency of state legislatures to adopt legislation near the end of the 
legislative session, which occurs in late spring or early summer in most states (NCSL 
2013). Meanwhile, the spike in adoptions at the end of the time period indicates that 
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many states waited until the last minute to decide whether or not to establish a health 
insurance exchange.  
 Further analysis using semiparametric Cox proportional hazards regression 
models provides a sense of which factors play a role in the diffusion of health insurance 
exchange policy and additionally, which factors may play a role in each state’s individual 
decision to either establish or not establish a health insurance exchange. The Cox models 
indicate that the ideology or partisan makeup of the state’s government, the political 
culture of a state, and to a lesser extent, the size of the state’s uninsured population have a 
statistically significant positive impact on health insurance exchange policy diffusion. To 
a significant extent, these three factors together do the most to explain the decisions of 
states to either adopt or not adopt health insurance exchange policy and the larger spread 
of the policy across the nation. A comparison of the survival rates of states with each 
political culture using the Kaplan-Meier estimator confirmed the important role of 
political culture in exchange policy diffusion.  Although other variables, such as unified 
party control and federal grant money, had a statistically significant impact on health 
insurance exchange policy diffusion in the Cox models, issues of covariance minimize 
the explanatory power of these variables. 
 When the results of the Cox models are further examined through the lens of 
Mohr’s theory of the determinants of innovations, a stark pattern emerges. The three 
strongest determinants of health insurance exchange policy diffusion, namely legislature 
ideology, political culture, and the size of the uninsured population, all measure, either 
directly or indirectly, a state’s motivation to adopt the policy. Since politicians are 
motivated to adopt policies that coincide with both their constituents’ and their personal 
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ideology in order to gain reelection and improve the public interest (Berry and Berry 
1990, 402; Berry et al. 1998, 327), the ideology of the legislature impacts the state 
government’s motivation to innovate (Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel 2004, 325). 
Political culture also impacts a state government’s motivation to innovate, because 
certain political cultures, namely moralistic and to a lesser extent, individualistic political 
cultures, are associated with views on the role of the government in welfare policy which 
encourage health insurance reform policy adoption (McGaughey and Mank 2001, 205). 
Finally, since state governments are more motivated to adopt public policies that address 
severe and salient problems (Karch 2006, 209) and since health insurance exchanges aim 
to decrease the uninsured population, the size of the uninsured population indirectly 
measures a state’s motivation to increase health insurance coverage through a health 
insurance exchange.  Given that all three of the statistically significant variables in my 
study measure the motivation to innovate, I conclude that the state governments’ 
motivation to innovate is the key determinant of health insurance exchange policy 
diffusion.   
 The findings of this study have broader policy implications for legislators and 
health policy leaders as they continue to consider, adopt, and advocate for further health 
reform policies. While each state government has made a preliminary decision 
concerning the development and operation of their state’s health insurance exchange, the 
adoption of health insurance exchange policy at the state level will continue. Even though 
each state’s initial decision to adopt a state run, partnership, or federally run exchange 
will remain in place for several years, states will have the option of moving from a 
federally run to either a partnership exchange or state run exchange. States may also 
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move from a partnership exchange to a state run exchange in the future (Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2012a, 2). Additionally, states who established state run or partnership 
exchanges have a significant degree of leeway in determining the specific details of their 
exchange. Although each exchange will be operational by January 2014, states with state 
run or partnership exchanges will inevitably continue to reform their exchanges over the 
years (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012a). States will also continue to adopt other health 
reform policies. For example, state governments are currently determining whether they 
will expand their Medicaid program as part of implementing the ACA (Somashekhar 
2013).  
As states continue to reform their health care systems and develop their health 
insurance exchanges, an understanding of the determinants of the initial adoption and 
diffusion of health insurance exchange policy will help legislators and policy leaders 
more effectively advocate for their preferred policies. Based on the findings of this study, 
the most important determinant of health insurance exchange policy adoption is the state 
government’s motivation to adopt the policy. Armed with this information, policy leaders 
can effectively focus their resources on influencing the legislature’s motivation to 
innovate. For example, since a state’s political culture influences the state’s government’s 
motivation to adopt policy innovations, policy leaders can highlight the ways in which 
their preferred policy coincides with the state’s political culture and fulfills the political 
culture’s views on the purpose of government in conversations with legislators. By 
efficiently focusing their efforts on altering the government’s motivation to adopt policy 
innovations, policy leaders should be more effective in achieving their legislative goals.  
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 The final analysis I conducted is an examination of the impact of the Supreme 
Court case NFIB v. Sebelius, which upheld the constitutionality of the ACA, on health 
insurance exchange policy diffusion. The analysis revealed that policy diffusion occurred 
at a higher rate in the six months following the Supreme Court decision than in the 27 
months preceding the decision. However, due to the limited time frame of the study and 
the short time span between the court’s decision and the federal deadline, I am hesitant to 
conclude that the Supreme Court decision was the cause of the increase in the diffusion 
rate. On the whole, the analysis of the impact of the Supreme Court decision on exchange 




























Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
Summary of Thesis 
 At its most basic, this thesis examines the recent diffusion of health insurance 
exchange policy among the US states. As a response to the Affordable Care Act’s 
requirement that every state have an operational health insurance exchange, each state 
decided to either establish a state run exchange, establish a partnership exchange in 
conjunction with the federal government, or take no action and default to a federally run 
exchange. Health insurance exchange policy quickly spread among the states as twenty 
four states and the District of Columbia established a state run or a partnership exchange. 
This study used event history analysis to determine which factors played a role in the 
states’ decision making processes and in the broader diffusion of the policy across the 
nation. 
 Health insurance exchanges are a vital component of the Affordable Care Act, as 
they are expected to both increase health insurance coverage and lower health insurance 
premiums by addressing the knowledge disparities that exist between health insurance 
providers and consumers. By providing consumers with clear and accessible information 
about available insurance plans, health insurance exchanges arm consumers with the 
knowledge needed to make an intelligent health insurance purchasing decision. The 
exchanges also lower insurance premiums and address insurance companies’ lack of 
knowledge concerning consumers’ future healthcare needs by pooling individuals and 
small businesses into larger risk pools. After appearing as an element of President 
Clinton’s failed 1993 health reform plan, the first health insurance exchange was enacted 
in Massachusetts in 2006. Using Massachusetts’ reform plan as an example, the ACA 
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mandated the creation of a health insurance exchange in every state. However, states 
could decide to develop and operate their own exchange, partner with the federal 
government in developing and operating the exchange, or default to a federally developed 
and operated health insurance exchange. After the passage of the ACA, health insurance 
exchange policy quickly spread among the states.  
 Since this thesis is an examination of the diffusion of a public policy, the policy 
diffusion literature strongly informs the methodological design of this project. In 
particular, Mohr’s (1969) theory of the determinants of innovation guides the study. 
Mohr theorized that innovation is related to the motivation to innovate, the obstacles to 
innovation, and the resources for overcoming these obstacles. Berry and Berry (1990) 
subsequently used Mohr’s theory to explain how factors both internal and external to the 
state impact state policy adoption and diffusion. Through the use of Mohr’s theory and 
through the development of a statistical technique which allows scholars to 
simultaneously examine the impact of internal and external factors on policy diffusion, 
Berry and Berry founded the contemporary policy diffusion literature. Since Berry and 
Berry’s seminal work, scholars have examined the diffusion of a wide variety of policies. 
However, regardless of the specific policy being examined, most policy diffusion studies 
include similar variables in their analyses. Mohr’s theory explains the expected impact of 
the variables, which include state socioeconomic characteristics, state political system 
characteristics, and the actions of actors outside the system, such as the other states’ 
governments. Using studies within the policy diffusion literature as examples, I include 
similar variables in my study of health insurance exchange policy. However, in addition 
to the commonly studied variables, I include variables which measure the impact of 
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federal government activity on exchange policy diffusion and variables which are 
expected to specifically impact the diffusion of social welfare and health reform policies 
in my analysis. 
 I determine the impact of these variables on health insurance exchange policy 
diffusion using event history analysis. More specifically, I use the Kaplan-Meier 
estimator to examine the relative speed of diffusion over the two and a half years between 
the passage of the ACA and the federal government’s deadline for health insurance 
exchange decisions. The estimator is also used to examine the relationship between a few 
categorical variables and the rate of diffusion and to examine the impact of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in NFIB v. Sebelius on exchange policy diffusion. I then used Cox 
proportional hazards regression models to determine the impact of the independent 
variables on health insurance exchange policy diffusion.  
 From my statistical analyses, I conclude that the motivation to innovate is the 
strongest determinant of health insurance exchange policy adoption and diffusion. More 
specifically, variables which measure a state government’s motivation to innovate, such 
as the partisan makeup of the state’s government, the political culture of the state, and the 
size of the state’s uninsured population, are all significant determinants of state health 
insurance exchange policy adoption and diffusion, while the other variables included in 
this analysis did not have a statistically significant impact. 
 
Future Research 
 While this study is a good starting point for beginning to understand the process 
of health insurance exchange policy diffusion, both refining this study’s analysis and 
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researching additional aspects of the health insurance exchange policy diffusion process 
will strengthen and extend our understanding of this complex issue.  
 Given that my study has a few methodological limitations, further research could 
reexamine the issue of health insurance exchange policy diffusion in a more 
methodologically sound manner. Examining the impact of alternative policy diffusion 
mechanisms, improving the measurement techniques used to calculate variables, and 
using more contemporary data sources would improve the methodological soundness of 
future examinations of health insurance exchange policy diffusion. An analysis of health 
insurance exchange policy diffusion using stronger methodological techniques could 
result in different findings and would certainly explain the diffusion process more 
accurately.  
 Although the choice between a state run exchange, partnership exchange, and 
federally run exchange was the major decision states faced in responding to the ACA’s 
health insurance exchange requirements, the states who established state run or 
partnership exchanges faced a number of additional policy decisions in developing their 
exchanges. For example, states need to decide whether to operate their insurance 
exchange using a clearinghouse model or an active purchaser model. While under a 
clearinghouse model, the exchange would be required to contract with every insurance 
plan meeting the federal minimum requirements, an active purchaser exchange could 
selectively contract with insurers based on criteria beyond the federal minimums (Kaiser 
Family Foundation 2012a, 3). States also need to decide whether to run the exchange as a 
state agency, a quasi-governmental entity, or as a non-profit independent from the state 
government (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012a, 3). An even more complete picture of the 
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health insurance exchange policy diffusion process would be gained from further 
research investigating the diffusion of these specific elements of health insurance 






































Appendix A: Measurement Techniques and Data Sources for Variables 
 
Variable Measurement Data Source 




Coded 0 when the state has not yet 
adopted a state run or partnership 
exchange. Coded 1 when the state 
has adopted a state run or 
partnership exchange beginning 
with the month during which the 








Personal Income Per capita personal income of the 
residents of a state. Ranges in value 
from $73,105 to $31,071. 
Council of State 
Governments’  
Book of the States (Wall 
2012a) 
State Fiscal Health Percentage of a state’s expenditures 
that can be paid with the same fiscal 
year’s revenue. This variable ranges 
in value from 115.5% to 88.17%. 
Book of the States (Wall 
2012d; Wall 2012e) 
State Debt A state’s outstanding debt in USD 
divided by the population of the 
state. This variable ranges in value 
from $73,105 to $31,071. 
Outstanding Debt Data: 
Book of the States (Wall 
2012b); Population Data: 




A state legislature’s professionalism 
score, with higher values indicating 
more professional legislatures. This 
variable ranges from 0.659 to 0.042 
in value. 
Squire (1992) 
Unified Party Control Coded as 1 when all branches of the 
state’s government are controlled by 
the same political party. Coded as 0 
in all other cases.  
Party Control of State 
Legislatures: National 
Conference of State 
Legislatures (2010; 2011); 
Party of Governor (2010; 
2011; 2012) 
Party Control Categorical variable which takes a 
value between 0 and 3 depending on 
how many branches of the state 
government are controlled by the 
Democratic Party. 
National Conference of 







Legislature Ideology Percentage of the total legislative 
seats in the state’s legislature and in 
the state’s delegation to Congress 
held by members of the Democratic 
Party. This variable ranges from 
89.83% to 14.89% in value.  
State Legislature Data: 
National Conference of 
State Legislatures (2010; 
2011); Congress Data: 
U.S. Government Printing 
Office (2009; 2011) 
Interest Group 
Activity 
Percentage of a state’s total 
employment taken up by either the 
health or insurance industries. This 
variable ranges in value from 
22.09% to 10.62%. 
U.S. Department of 
Commerce’s Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
(2012b) 
Election Proximity Coded as 1 if the month falls in a 
state election year. Coded 0 in all 
other cases. November and 
December are always coded as 0 
regardless of the year. 
Council of State 
Governments’ Book of 
the States (Wall 2012c; 
2012f) 
Political Culture Coded as 3 if the state has a 
moralistic political culture. Coded 
as 2 if the state has an 
individualistic political culture. 
Coded as 1 if the state has a 
traditionalistic political culture.  
Elazar (1972) 
Uninsured Population Percentage of a state’s population 
without health insurance. Variable 
ranges from 24.6% to 3.4% in 
value. 




The number of full time staff at a 
state government’s department of 
insurance per 100,000 people living 
in the state. Variable ranges from 
6.94 to 1.1 in value. 
Size of Staff: 
Ananthapura (1995); 
Population Data: U.S. 
Census Bureau (2012b) 
Regional Diffusion The percentage of states in the 
state’s U.S. Census region that have 
already established a state run or 
partnership exchange. Ranges in 
value from 75% to 0%. 
U.S. Census Region 
Information: U.S. Census 
Bureau; Policy Adoption 
Information: Kaiser 
Family Foundation’s State 
Exchange Profiles 
(2013b) 
Federal Grant Money The total value in USD of grants 
received by the state from the 
federal government for the purpose 
of establishing a health insurance 
exchange. Ranges in value from 
$236,901,012 to $0. 
 
 







The mean of each state’s 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index for 
the small group and individual 
insurance markets. Higher values 
are associated with increased 
competition in the insurance market. 
Ranges in value from 8300.5 to 
1575. 
























Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Dependent Variable   
Health Insurance Exchange 
Policy Adoption 
.193 .394 
Independent Variables   
Personal Income 40858 7227.84 
State Fiscal Health 99.8 5.88 
State Debt  3827.38 2179.26 
Legislative Professionalism .221 .142 
Unified Party Control .611 .488 
Party Control 1.37 1.24 
Legislature Ideology 48.74 17.07 
Interest Group Activity 16.05 2.55 
Election Proximity .505 .5 
Political Culture 2.019 .812 
Uninsured Population 14.43 4.07 
Regulatory Agency Size 3.34 1.55 
Regional Diffusion 19.26 20.88 
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